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COMMENTS
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AVAILABILITY OF FEDERAL POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IN
LIGHT OF A SUBSEQUENT CHANGE IN LAW
INTRODUCTION
Our system of justice seeks finality in crimi-
nal prosecutions in order to ensure the ade-
quate administration of justice. Yet, the protec-
tion of rights through appeal and through the
availability of a special reviewing forum to
afford relief in exceptional cases has tradition-
ally been a part of the criminal justice system.
This special relief has taken the form of the
writ of habeas corpus and the more recent
federal counterpart of habeas corpus: section
2255 of title 28 of the United States Code.:
128 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) reads, in part, as
follows:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a
court established by Act of Congress claiming
the right to be released upon the ground that
the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or
that the court was without jurisdiction to im-
pose such sentence, or that the sentence was
in excess of the maximum authorized by law,
or is otherwise subject to collateral attack
may move the court which imposed the sen-
tence to vacate, set aside or correct the sen-
tence.
A motion for such relief may be made at
any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records
of the case conclusively show that the prisoner
is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause
notice thereof to be served upon the United
States attorney, grant a prompt hearing
thereon, determine the issues and make find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law with re-
spect thereto. If the court finds that the judg-
ment was rendered without jurisdiction, or
that the sentence imposed was not authorized
by law or otherwise open to collateral attack,
or that there had been such a denial or m-
fringement of the constitutional rights of the
prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable
to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and
set the judgment aside and shall discharge the
prisoner or resentence him or grant a new
The tension between these two competing
concerns has been the subject of discussion
as courts seek to determine when further ap-
peals from a conviction will no longer be al-
lowed. It is necessary to impose finality on
prosecutions after having offered the defendant
an adequate opportunity to present his claims
to higher courts for review. Yet, when a de-
fendant alleges a violation of a fundamental
right in the trial process, the courts may be
egregiously denying the defendant justice if
they fail to hear the defendant's claim. 2 judges
make mistakes and, cognizant of these errors,
reviewing courts may grant a petitioner yet
another hearing to see if the "right" decision
has been made. Recognizing that courts can
never make the conclusively correct decision,
however, the criminal justice system must im-
pose limits on the appellate process. 3
Traditionally the avenues of appeal estab-
lished the necessary finality. After an exhaus-
trial or correct the sentence as may appear
appropriate.
See note 23 infra for a discussion of the relation-
ship between habeas corpus and § 2255.
2 In his extensive article on the development of
federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, Paul M.
Bator noted:
Assuming that there 'exists,' in an ultimate
sense, a 'correct' decision of a question of law,
we can never be assured that any particular
tribunal has in the past made it; we can al-
ways continue to ask whether the right rule
was applied, whether a new rule should not
have been fashioned.
Bator, Finality in Crimindal Law and Federal Ha-
beas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv.
441, 447 (1963).3 Bator concludes that "if a criminal judgment is
ever to be final, the notion of legality must at
some point include the assignment of final compe-
tence to determine legality." Id. at 450.
17
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tion of these standard appellate procedures a
defendant could bring only the most grievous
claims of unjust confinement in a writ of ha-
beas corpus, alleging a violation of constitu-
tional rights or lack of jurisdiction in the trial
court. Increasingly, however, the Supreme
Court has expanded the availability of this
post-conviction relief to allow appeals from
otherwise final convictions.
Recently the Supreme Court in United
States v. Davis4 held that confinement in viola-
tion of a law of the United States, as well as
an unconstitutional detention, allowed a motion
under section 2255. This decision also held
that a change in law subsequent to a person's
conviction and appeal was also sufficient to
merit collateral attack. The subsequent interpre-
tations of this decision, coupled with its histor-
ical justification, provide guidelines for under-
standing the import of the holding.
A brief review of the facts of Davis
provides a background for the discussion of
the Court's reasoning. Joseph Anthony Davis,
classified 1-A by his draft board, received an
order to report for a pre-induction physical in
February of 1965. Due to illness and failure to
notify his local board of his current address,
Davis missed several scheduled appearances
and was therefore declared delinquent by his
local board. After refusing twice to report for
induction subsequent to this delinquent classifi-
cation,5 he was prosecuted and convicted.6
While Davis' appeal was pending in the
Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court announced
4 417 U.S. 333 (1974).
5 This delinquent classification was authorized
by 32 C.F.R. § 1642.4(a) (1967) which allowed
a local board to declare a registrant delinquent for
failure to comply with appropriate duties. Such
duties include reporting for a physical exam (32
C.F.R. § 1641.4 (1974)) and keeping the local
board informed of a current address (32 C.F.R. §
1641.1 (1974)).
'6 60 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) provides, in pertinent
part:
Any person . . . who in any manner shall
knowingly fail or neglect or refuse to perform
any duty required of him under or in the exe-
cution of this title, or rule, regulations, or
directions made pursuant to this title . . .
shall, upon conviction in any district court of
the United States of competent jurisdiction, be
punished by imprisonment for not more than
five years or a fine of not more than $10,000,
or by both such fine and imprisonment.
its decision in Gitknecht v. United States.7 In
Gutknecht the Court held that "the selective
service regulations that accelerated the induc-
tion of delinquent registrants by shifting them
to the first priority in the order of call were
punitive in nature and, as such, were without
legislative sanction!" ' The Ninth Circuit
therefore remanded the Davis case for consid-
eration "in light of the intervening deci-
sion...." On remand the district court con-
cluded that there had been no acceleration
because of Davis' delinquent status and found
that the decision in Gultknecht, therefore, did
not affect Davis' conviction.
While Davis' request for a writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court was pending, the Ninth
Circuit decided United States v. Fox.10 The
Fox court applied the Gutknecht decision to
reverse the conviction of Fox, reasoning that
"Fox's induction was accelerated by the decla-
ration of delinquency as a matter of law
[because] [w]ithout the declaration, the Board
could not have ordered him to report for
induction."1"I The circumstances leading to
Fox's induction order were virtually identical
to those in Davis' case.1 2
In light of the Fox decision, Davis unsuc-
cessfully sought a rehearing before the court of
appeals and commenced serving his three year
sentence. Davis then instituted a collateral
7 396 U.S. 295 (1970).
8417 U.S. at 338 (Davis paraphrasing Gut-
kiecht).
9 432 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1970).
10 454 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1972).
31 The court in Gutknecht had invalidated the
induction of a delinquent on the basis of evidence
of actual punitive acceleration of induction on the
part of the local board. Relying on the Gutknecht
reasoning, the government offered evidence of lack
of actual acceleration of the defendant's induction
in both Fox and Davis. The court in Davis found
no actual acceleration of the defendant's induction
despite Davis' delinquent classification. The gov-
ernment had shown that many registrants in the
same class as Davis had already been inducted
prior to Davis due to Davis' failure to report for
scheduled physicals.
The decision in Fox, however, established a con-
clusive presumption that a declaration of delin-
quency by a local board accelerated the induction
of a registrant. The Fox court reasoned that the
local board could not have ordered the regis-
trant's induction were it not for the delinquent
classification, and thus delinquency hastened the
induction.
12 417 U.S. at 339.
[Vol. 66
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
proceeding under section 2255, asserting that
the decision in Fox had affected a change in
law in the Ninth Circuit which should afford
him collateral relief. The district court summa-
rily denied petitioner's motion. The court of
appeals affirmed this decision without consider-
ing the merits of Davis' claim.13 They rea-
soned that the decision in Davis on direct ap-
peal was the law of the case and that any new
law in that circuit would not be applied "under
circumstances such as here presented." 14 Be-
cause the case presented "a seemingly impor-
tant question concerning the extent to which
relief under section 2255 is available by reason
of an intervening change in law," 1 5 the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari.
LAW VIOLATION COGNIZABLE
In deciding that a change in statutory inter-
pretation would afford a prisoner recourse
under section 2255, the majority in Davis
looked first to the statutory language itself.
They cited the first paragraph of this section
which allows a federal prisoner to assert a
claim that his "confinement is 'in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United
States.' "s The majority felt that this lan-
guage rather plainly indicated that a violation
of the law is cognizable.
The dissent, however, contended that the
third paragraph of section 2255 operated to
more specifically define the precise scope of re-
lief. Justice Rehnquist pointed out, moreover,
that the passage from the first paragraph
quoted by the majority "does not speak of an
illegal 'confinement' as suggested by the Court,
or even an illegal conviction, but rather of ille-
gal sentences." 17 Therefore Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that only when sentences were in vio-
lation of the constitution or laws of the United
States, could the court grant relief under sec-
tion 2255.
Justice Rehnquist interpreted paragraph one
to be concerned with the availability of mo-
tions, whereas paragraph three listed the relief
which the courts could grant. This third para-
graph made "no mention of judgments ren-
1s 472 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1972).
14 Id.
1 417 U.S. at 341.
16 417 U.S. at 342 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
17 417 U.S. at 356 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
dered in violation of the laws of the United
States." 18 In analyzing appropriate situations
for relief, Justice Rehnquist found relief avail-
able only when: (1) the court which rendered
judgment was without jurisdiction, (2) the
sentence was not authorized by law or was
otherwise open -to collateral attack, or (3)
such a denial of constitutional rights had oc-
curred as to render the judgment vulnerable to
collateral attack. 9 The dissent argued that the
facts of Davis did not meet any of these tests.
The majority retorted to this reading of the
statute by characterizing it as "microscopic,"
while admitting that -the "statutory language is
somewhat lacking in precision." 2 0 The major-
ity contended that the subsequent judicial in-
terpretations of the statute cleared up any am-
biguity and supported their interpretation that
a violation of the law is sufficient for a section
2255 motion. Judge Friendly cogently recog-
nized the technicalities of these arguments in
United States v. Sobell2l in which he 'spoke
about his attempts to analyze section 2255:
If it be deemed futile to endeavor to draw
much meaning from the rather murky lan-
guage of § 2255 and we turn for help to the
decisions thereunder, we find these telling us
that, in determining whether relief under
§ 2255 ought be granted, we should look to the
previous practice in habeas corpus with re-
spect to federal prisoners: ... [b]ut this also
does not get us far; the glass itself is a dark
one.
2 2
Thus, the language of section 2255, although
susceptible to analysis, is ambiguous. The cases
dealing with this area provide some assistance
in delineating its parameters.
A review of the case law associated with the
availability of habeas corpus and section 2255
relief demonstrates the consistent expansion of
the cognizable grounds for relief. The Judicial
Conference of 1942 recommended the passage
of section 2255 as a more convenient substi-
1s 417 U.S. at 357 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19 417 U.S. at 357 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of the even more limited view-
point of Justice Black toward § 2255 relief see
note 89 infra.
20 417 U.S. at 343.
21314 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
847 (1963).
22 314 F.2d at 322.
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tute for habeas corpus for federal prisoners.2 3
Since the scope of section 2255 was to be ex-
actly the same as that of habeas corpus relief,
a review of the development of habeas corpus
will also provide accurate background for sec-
tion 2255.
The language in the Judiciary Act of 1789
which provided for habeas corpus relief stated
only that the courts of the United States "shall
have power to issue writs of . . . habeas
corpus." 24 The Supreme Court initially limited
habeas corpus relief to cases where the trial
court had never had jurisdiction to consider
the case. The decision in Ex parte Watkins25
established the principle that as long as the
trial court had proper jurisdiction, even a sub-
stantive error by that court would not render a
detention illegal so as to allow a writ of ha-
beas corpus to issue.
This limitation pervaded the habeas corpus
decisions after Ex parte Watkins, but courts
began to contrive jurisdictional defects in
many cases in order to grant relief. For exam-
ple, in Johnson v. Zerbst,26 the Court held that
2 3 See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205(1952) for a detailed history of the development
of § 2255. Briefly, the Judicial Conference of the
United States was convened to recommend revi-
sions in the United States Code. Justice Vinson,
the chairman of the Judicial Conference, was also
the author of the Hayman decision. This confer-
ence recommended passage of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in
order to alleviate problems that had developed in
the administration of habeas corpus proceedings
for federal prisoners. The grounds for § 2255 re-
lief were intended to be exactly the same as those
for federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. The
only effect of § 2255 was to change the forum that
federal prisoners would use to present their claims.
4 Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1
Stat. 81.
25 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).26 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Two major cases fol-
lowing Ex parte Watkins characterized the incon-
sistencies that developed as courts grappled with
the proper scope of habeas corpus relief. Frank v.
Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), dealt with a state
prisoner's attempt to raise an alleged constitutional
error in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. The
Court in Frank concluded that if the state court
considered the constitutional claim on appeal, the
federal habeas corpus court may review only the
state procedure of review. However, in Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), the Court held that
federal courts could redetermine federal claims de
novo on petitions for habeas corpus relief. Al-
though commentators have sought to reconcile
these two holdings, these decisions represent the
vacillation that developed in federal habeas corpus
proceedings.
a federal trial court did not have jurisdiction
over a defendant who was denied assistance of
counsel. Decisions such as this demonstrate the
attenuated arguments to which courts resorted
in order to find that an error resulted in lack
of jurisdiction in the trial court. The courts
refused to admit that the real thrust of their
decisions was to expand the issues properly
recognized in a habeas corpus proceeding.
Rather, they continued to obscure the situation
by references to lack of jurisdiction.27 This ar-
tificiality led the Court in Waley v. Johnston28
to acknowledge expressly that constitutional as
well as jurisdictional questions were available
as bases for habeas corpus relief.
Brown v. Allen"9 then expanded this Waley
doctrine by holding that all federal constitu-
tional questions were cognizable in federal ha-
beas corpus proceedings. When the Supreme
Court decided Brown in 1953, Congress had
revised the United States Code to substitute
section 2255 as the avenue of relief for federal
prisoners in lieu of federal habeas corpus. The
Brown decision concerned only federal habeas
corpus; yet, since Congress intended section
2255 to be the precise equivalent of federal ha-
beas corpus any expansion of rights for state
prisoners would apply equally to federal pris-
oners under section 2255.
To complete the availability of constitutional
issues for use in collateral attack, Kaufman v.
27 One commentary has described this decision
as follows:
[This decision] reveals in a dramatic way
that the use of 'jurisdiction' merely served to
obscure the real problem, which was the
proper range of issues cognizable on habeas.
Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Cor-
pus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 103&, 1054 (1970).
28 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
29 344 U.S. 443 (1953). The Brown Court
claimed to be following Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86 (1923), in holding that all federal consti-
tutional questions raised by a state petitioner were
cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding
despite a full state hearing. The argument against
allowing such broad habeas corpus relief was the
desire for finality in criminal prosecutions, but the
Court in Brown reasoned that habeas corpus did
not concern guilt or innocence as much as protec-
tion of constitutional rights. Implicit in Brown
was the desire to have constitutional claims con-
sidered in a federal forum. Another primary moti-
vation was to ensure the uniform application of




United States"° made constitutional issues
available for use in collateral attack by permit-
ting federal prisoners to raise any constitu-
tional claim on a section 2255 motion. The
only limitation here was that having made a
constitutional claim upon direct appeal a fed-
eral prisoner could not again raise the same
claim in a subsequent section 2255 motion.
There is little indication that courts prior to
Davis had envisioned an expansion of cogniza-
ble issues for collateral attack to claims which
do not present a constitutional question. Unless
the facts of the claim went to jurisdictional er-
rors,3 1 courts would deny such motions in ha-
beas corpus. Yet, courts before the Davis deci-
sion had agreed to hear claims of violation of
law that went to the illegality of the detention
itself. For example, -the failure of public au-
thorities to provide mental treatment for a pa-
tient involuntarily committed was sufficient to
merit collateral attack in Rouse v. Cameron.
32
However, cases such as Lothridge v. United
States33 continued to require generally a claim
of constitutional dimensions for a section 2255
motion. In that case the defendant brought a
section 2255 action claiming that the judge
improperly failed to instruct the jury on en-
trapment. The court curtly dismissed this mo-
tion on the grounds that "no issue of constitu-
so 394 U.S. 217 (1969). Before the Kaufman de-
cision some federal courts had refused to hear cer-
tain questions under § 2255 which courts had al-
lowed state prisoners to raise on habeas corpus.
Compare Warren v. United States, 311 F.2d 673
(8th Cir. 1963) (illegality of search and seizure
not cognizable under § 2255) zvith Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (illegality of search
and seizure allowed to be raised on habeas corpus
by state prisoners). The Kaufinaun decision put
such conflict to rest by holding that all constitu-
tional claims are cognizable under § 2255 for fed-
erai prisoners. The basis of this decision was a de-
sire to provide a separate proceeding to consider
constitutional claims whether for a federal or state
prisoner.
31 See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193
(1830).
32 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Petitioner in
this case was involuntarily committed to a mental
hospital and brought a writ of habeas corpus for
release. The petitioner claimed that in order to
commit a person against his will a court must
have some justification; although treatment had
been the purpose of this commitment, no treatment
had been given. See also Donaldson v. O'Connor,
493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974).
33 441 F.2d 919 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1003 (1971).
tional dimensions being present, the issue of
entrapment cannot be raised on collateral at-
tack under section 2255." 34
Even Kaufman v. United States, the control-
ling Supreme Court case in this area prior to
Davis, had mentioned in dicta that courts had
refused to allow claims of error of law by a
trial court to be raised in collateral attack,35
citing Sunal v. Large36 and Hill v. United
States.37 The Supreme Court had never held
that collateral proceedings were absolutely
closed to statutory questions, however, and the
Davis majority found that Sunal and Hill
offered little support for Kaufman's contention
that courts will not hear claims of error of law
in a section 2255 motion.
The Kaufman Court cited the decision in
Sun a as standing for the proposition that sec-
tion 2255 is not designed for collateral review
of errors of law committed by a trial court.
The Court in Davis, however, felt that Sunal
merely stated the proposition as a general rule
subject to exceptions. The Davis Court con-
tended that Sunal could not obtain relief under
section 2255 because of his failure to avail
himself of the regular appellate procedure. The
Davis Court cited the following passage from
Sunal in support of this interpretation of the
case:
Of course if Sunal and Kulick had pursued
the appellate course and failed, their cases
would be quite different. But since they chose
not to pursue the remedy which they had, we
do not think they should now be allowed to
justify their failure by saying they deemed
any appeal futile. 38
341d. at 922. See also Limon-Gonzales v. United
States, 499 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1974) where a
federal prisoner sought § 2255 relief claiming a vi-
olation of rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure. The court denied this petition since
the grounds asserted did not "rise to the constitu-
tional or jurisdictional significance as required for
relief under section 2255." 499 F.2d at 937.
35 394 U.S. at 223.36 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
37 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
38 332 U.S. at 181. The Court focused on the
failure of these defendants to utilize appellate pro-
cedures as a basis for a denial of their post-con-
viction motion. The court relates this failure to
appeal to finality in criminal cases:
If defendants who accept the judgment of con-
viction and do not appeal can later renew their
attack on the judgment by habeas corpus, liti-
1975]
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Thus the impression remains that had Sunal
appealed, the Court might have deemed his
claim appropriate for section 2255 relief.
The Court in Hill also denied a section
2255 motion. The Kaufman Court contended
that this denial substantiated the position that
a defendant could not raise a statutory claim
in such a motion. But the language used by the
Court in Hill to deny the petitioner's claim ac-
tually recognized a right, as the Court in
Davis read the passage, to review some statu-
tory claims. The trial court in Hill did not
allow the defendant to speak in his own behalf
before sentencing. The Supreme Court then
denied Hill's section 2255 motion based upon
that error by saying:
It is an error which is neither jurisdictional
nor constitutional. It is not a fundamental de-
fect which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice, nor an omission incon-
sistent with the rudimentary demands of fair
procedure. It does not present 'exceptional cir-
cumstances where the need for the remedy af-
forded by the writ of habeas corpus is appar-
ent.' Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27P
One might question whether the second and
third sentences in this passage merely further
explain the nature of jurisdictional or constitu-
tional errors rather than establish additional
grounds for relief. The Court in Davis, howev-
er, had no doubt. The language of section
2255 coupled with the consistent expansion of
habeas corpus relief by the courts led the
Court in Davis to recognize fully a right to
present some errors of law for review under
section 2255 subject only to the general cave-
ats of Hill.
One case following the Davis decision per-
gation in these criminal cases will be inter-
minable. Wise judicial administration of the
federal courts counsels against such course,
at least where the error does not trench on
any constitutional rights of defendants nor in-
volve the jurisdiction of the trial court.
332 U.S. at 182.
Judge Rutledge, in his dissent in Sunal, found
this denial of relief to be truly unjust:
Certainly a basic miscarriage of justice is no
less great or harmful, either to the individual
or to the general cause of personal liberty,
merely because appeal has not been taken,
than where appeal is taken but relief is
wrongfully denied.
332 U.S. at 190.
39 368 U.S. at 428.
mitted a section 2255 motion for an alleged vi-
olation of a law of the United States. In
United States ex rel. Soto v. United States,40
petitioner claimed that the trial court, by fail-
ing to advise appellant of his right to proceed
pro se, deprived him of that right thereby com-
mitting reversible error. In granting this mo-
tion the Third Circuit characterized this right
to proceed pro se as a fundamental right even
if not of constitutional dimensions. They there-
fore concluded that the statutory right was suf-
ficient to afford jurisdiction under the holding
of Davis.
Although the court in Soto held that the
right violated was fundamental, the court did
not provide any guidelines for determining the
fundamental nature of rights in the future.
This court, then, held only that a violation of
this right to proceed pro se satisfied the test of
Hilt that exceptional circumstances be shown
before courts may grant collateral relief.
The preceding section thus illustrates the
continual expansion of grounds cognizable as
basis for relief under habeas corpus and the
related provision of section 2255. The follow-
ing section evaluates the second element of the
Court's decision in Davis, the effect of a subse-
quent change in law.
HIsToRY OF CHANGE IN LAW
After establishing that confinement in viola-
tion of a law of the United States affords a
petitioner recourse under section 2255, the
issue remains whether a change in law after
conviction creates an illegal confinement which
merits relief. Is a person truly being confined
in violation of the laws of the United States
when he has been convicted under a valid stat-
ute, when he has utilized the appropriate appel-
late process fully, and when he has been finally
sentenced, only to have a subsequent change in
the law present him with an opportunity for
release? This section will analyze the reason-
ing of the Supreme Court in Davis Which al-
4o 504 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1974). The court in
Soto recognized the expansion of § 2255 relief
which Davis now affords. The Soto court noted that
the "Government's position [that law violations
could not be raised under § 2255] was widely ac-
cepted before Davis ... Many commentators have
read Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947), and
Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962), as
limiting § 2255 relief solely to constitutional
claims." 504 F.2d at 1342.
[Vol. 66
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lowed a change in law to suffice for a motion
under section 2255, and then it will review the
judicial history concerned with the change in
law issue.
To support their contention that the change
in law presented by Davis affords a prisoner
relief under section 2255, the majority in
Davis relied primarily upon two cases, neither
of which truly support its position. The
Court cited passages from Sanders v. United
States"' and Kaufman v. United States42 to in-
dicate that a subsequent change in law after
conviction and sentencing undoubtedly affords
one access to section 2255.
In Sanders the petitioner was serving a sen-
tence for bank robbery. The court denied a
hearing on Sanders' first motion to vacate the
sentence, which he filed on January 4, 1960,
since he alleged no facts, but only a conclusion
that he was entitled to relief. On September 8,
1960, Sanders filed a second section 2255 mo-
tion which alleged facts to demonstrate his
mental incompetence at the time of trial and
sentencing. The district court also denied this
motion. The court of appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision. In denying this request
for a subsequent hearing, the court of appeals
said that the fact that the petitioner knowingly
omitted relevant facts at the time of his first
motion barred his subsequent motion. 43 The
Supreme Court, however, held that the tradi-
tional notions of finality of criminal convic-
tions were not applicable to section 2255 mo-
tions since fundamental rights were concerned.
It cited Fay v. Noia for the principle that res
judicata is inapplicable in habeas proceedings.44
41373 U.S. 1 (1962).
42 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
43 297 F.2d 735, 736 (9th Cir. 1961).
44372 U.S. 391 (1963). Res judicata tradition-
ally prohibits a party from relitigating with the
same opposing party an issue that a prior court
has already determined. Courts use this phrase fre-
quently when considering collateral attacks to indi-
cate that grounds raised on appeal may still be
raised in a habeas corpus proceeding in federal
court. Kaufman allowed all constitutional claims
to be raised on a § 2255 motion but also held that
if petitioner raised the constitutional claim on di-
rect appeal, he could not then relitigate this issue.
The Kaufman Court reasoned that a determination
of a constitutional issue by a federal appellate
court satisfied the requirement for federal review
of constitutional claims.
Thus a federal prisoner may make subsequent
motions to vacate judgment under § 2255. In this
sense the principle of res judicata is inapplicable.
In establishing standards to determine if a hear-
ing on a section 2255 motion is necessary, the
Court in Sanders reasoned that a prior section
2255 motion would bar a subsequent motion if:
(1) the court had considered the same ground
in a prior application, (2) the prior determina-
tion was on the merits, or (3) the ends of
justice would not be served by reaching the
merits of the subsequent application.
The facts of Sanders fall within the first two
of these standards. The court did not reach the
merits of Sanders' first section 2255 motion
but denied it because of the mere conclusory
nature of the motion and the absence of any
factual support for the allegations. Thus, the
Supreme Court ruled that the court should
properly have allowed Sanders to amend his
application to supply the necessary facts. The
denial of the application did not, therefore, bar
a new motion alleging proper facts. Thus the
Court allowed a subsequent hearing based upon
the first two standards which it listed. The
third standard, therefore, was not applicable to
the Court's holding in Sanders.
In the Sanders Court's discussion of this third
standard, however, the Davis Court found sup-
port for its contention that a change in law
merits a section 2255 motion. The Davis ma-
jority quoted the following passage from Sand-
ers: "The applicant may be entitled to a new
hearing upon showing an intervening change
in law . . . ." -However, the Sanders Court
was concerned with a hearing on a claim con-
cededly cognizable under section 2255, not
with grounds for a section 2255 motion. Jus-
tice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Davis, dis-
cussed this distinction:
Thus the Court in Sanders was faced with the
question not of whether a particular type of
claim is cognizable at all in a § 2255 proceed-
ing but simply whether a hearing is required
in a claim concededly within the reach of that
section.46
But a petitioner may not relitigate the same issues
once a federal appellate forum has decided them
unless the law has significantly changed since the
prior appeal.
45 373 U.S. at 17.
46417 U.S. at 362 n.18 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). Thei availability of a hearing where the
claimant presents an otherwise valid § 2255 motion
is a distinct problem. Courts may not exchange
criteria for the sufficiency of a motion itself with
the determination of whether to hold a hearing.
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Thus the decision in Sanders presumed a suffi-
cient claim and therefore considered the
secondary question of the availability of a
hearing on the merits.
The complete quote from Sanders, moreover,
Under the 1867 Act (now 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.
(Supp. IV, 1974)) United States District Courts
have jurisdiction to determine whether a prisoner
has been deprived of liberty in violation of consti-
tutional rights, even though the proceedings result-
ing in incarceration may be unassailable on the
face of the record. Under the Act, courts have
held a variety of allegations to permit challenge of
convictions on facts not contained within the rec-
ord. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 109 (1942)
(coerced guilty plea) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938) (no intelligent waiver of counsel in
federal court) ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935) (knowing use of perjured testimony by
prosecution); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923) (mob domination of trial).
The concern when deciding whether a hearing is
necessary is with the nature and specificity of the
facts presented in the prisoner's petition. The cru-
cial element is whether the disputed facts alleged
in the motion under § 2255 can be resolved by re-
course to the trial record. Thus, the principle re-
mains that even if a § 2255 motion presents suffi-
cient factual allegations, the district court need not
always have a hearing. Eaton v. United States,
458 F.2d 704 (7th Cir.). cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880
(1972).
When a petitioner alleges facts not found in the
record, a hearing becomes necessary. In Machi-
broda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) peti-
tioner alleged that his guilty plea at trial was in-
voluntary. The Court recognized that "a guilty
plea, if induced by promises or threats which de-
prive it of the character of a voluntary act, is
void. A conviction based upon such a plea is open
to collateral attack." 368 U.S. at 493.
The district court denied Machibroda's motion
without a hearing. The Supreme Court, however,
held that this type of claim alleged a disputed
issue which neither the record nor the personal
knowledge of the judge could settle. Thus the
Court held that the "District Court did not pro-
ceed in conformity with § 2255 when it made find-
ings on controverted issues of fact, without notice
to the petitioner and without a hearing." 368 U.S.
at 494.
The petitioner had alleged facts which, if true,
would have afforded him relief under § 2255. The
district court could not determine the accuracy of
the claim by recourse merely to the record or to
the judge's personal knowledge. This type of a sit-
uation necessitates a hearing.
The Court in Machibroda noted that the pres-
ence of the petitioner himself at this hearing is not
always necessary. It is within the district court's
discretion to call the prisoner for the hearing and
"there are times when allegations of facts outside
the record can be fully investigated without re-
quiring the personal presence of the prisoner." 368
U.S. at 495.
indicates a further dilution of this passage's
significance for the Davis majority:
If purely legal questions are involved, the ap-
plicant may be entitled to a new hearing upon
showing an intervening change in the law or
some other justification for having failed to
raise a crucial point or argument in the prior
application. 47
Therefore, a mere change in law was not the
issue in Sanders, but rather a change or justi-
fication sufficient to explain the petitioner's
failure to raise a crucial point or argument in
his prior application. The facts of Davis do
not present this situation since Davis fully
argued .all issues in his direct appeal which he
later sought to present in his section 2255 mo-
tion. The considerations in Sanders, then,
offer scant support for the contention of the
Court in Davis that any change in law makes
collateral attack possible.
The Davis Court next referred to Kaufman
v. United States for support. In Kaufman the
majority adopted the reasoning of Judge
Wright in his dissent in Thornton v. United
States"s from which the Davis Court carefully
selected an excerpt. Justice Stewart in Davis,
citing Thornton, argued that a section 2255
motion would be permissible "if new law has
been made . . . since the trial and appeal."" 9
Again, viewing this quotation in context pro-
vides a more accurate picture:
Where a federal trial or appellate court has
had a 'say' on a federal prisoner's claim, there
may be no need for collateral relitigation. But
what if the federal trial or appellate court said
nothing because the issue was not raised? ....
What if new law has been made or facts un-
covered relating to the constitutional clain
since the trial and appeal? 50
Here the quote relates to facts different from
47 373 U.S. at 17.
48 368 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In Thornton
the petitioner alleged that evidence seized in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment had been used to
convict him at trial. The majority denied his § 2255
motion since they found that he could have raised
these issues at trial and on appeal but had failed to
do so. Judge Wright, dissenting, argued that since
the court of appeals had never heard the constitu-
tional claim, the court should allow the claim on a§ 2255 motion despite the failure to raise it on
appeal.
49 417 U.S. at 342.50 Id. (emphasis added).
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those of the case at bar. Kaufman had failed to
raise a constitutional claim on appeal with the
result that the court of appeals did not con-
sider that issue. However, since the claim was
of constitutional dimensions, the court could
consider this motion for relief under section
2255.
These cases represent the extent of Supreme
Court discussion on the change of law issue.51
The reliance of the Davis Court on these prior
cases, therefore, seems inappropriate since
these prior cases do not concern the issue pre-
sented by the facts of Davis. The lower federal
courts also have considered this problem; yet,
they too have reached no consensus concerning
the availability of habeas corpus or section
2255 relief after a change in law. In the past,
courts have consistently rejected the idea that
a convicted criminal who had tried and failed
on appeal could gain a new trial or complete
release due to a subsequent change in law. As
the grounds available for habeas corpus relief
expanded, however, the courts began to waiver
in their firm refusal to consider a convict's
claim due to an intervening change in law.
An early landmark case, Warring v. Col-
poys,-52 demonstrated the courts' reluctance to
consider an appeal based upon an alleged
change in law. Here the petitioner was sen-
tenced February 24, 1939, on four criminal
contempt charges. On April 14, 1939, the Su-
preme Court handed down a new interpreta-
tion of the statute under which he had been
convicted. This new interpretation would have
resulted in a verdict for petitioner had it ap-
plied in his case. In rejecting the habeas cor-
pus petition of the convicted person, the court
said:
When a case is decided it is expected that
people will make their behavior conform to
the rule it lays down and also to the principle
expressed in so far as it can be determined....
51 Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947) is one
other Supreme Court case dealing with a change
in law. Petitioner was convicted for failure to sub-
mit to induction; he took no appeal from this con-
viction since Sunal thought that it would be futile
given the current state of the law. His § 2255
motion came after a favorable change in the law,
but the Supreme Court would not allow a § 2255
motion since Sunal had purposefully by-passed the
appellate review. See note 38 supra.
2122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 678 (1941).
If, at last, the first decision is overruled, then
there is new law, better evidence, or an en-
lightened basis for prediction. Those trans-
actions which occurred between the two deci-
sions, are, for the most part, accepted history.
This is true even though a person had pres-
ented, in proper fashion, his case to the courts.
His rights being finally determined, an attempt
to reopen the question, in view of the new
enlightenment would be greeted with the power-
ful answer of res judicata.53
The court rejected the idea that a new statutory
construction, as here, invalidated a previous
construction of the statute. It reasoned that
people conform their behavior to existing law.
One who has violated the law of his time
should not, therefore, receive the benefit of a
newer interpretation of the same law.
LaClair v. United States,54 a fairly recent
case, embodies this same rationale. LaClair
was convicted of bank robbery and sentenced
to thirty years. After his conviction, the federal
court reinterpreted the statute under which he
had been convicted to require only an "objec-
tive fear" test for the victims of an armed rob-
bery-that is, the gun must have actually been
loaded. LaClair sought to raise this issue on a
section 2255 motion, but the court held that
"it had been repeatedly held that subsequent
changes in substantive decisional law does not
warrant relief under Section 2255." 55
Both of these cases involved statutory
changes which, if applied to the defendants,
would have freed them. But since the petitioner
could not raise errors of law on collateral at-
tack and since the courts had not given these
interpretations retroactive effect, neither peti-
tioner could raise a successful habeas corpus
motion.
When the Supreme Court began to expand
constitutional rights under the fourth amend-
ment, the problems of denying section 2255 re-
lief to those affected by the extension of these
rights increased. In Gaitan v. United States56
defendant was convicted of a narcotics viola-
tion with evidence obtained from an illegal
search having been introduced at the trial. Fol-
lowing the establishment of the exclusionary
53122 F.2d at 644.
.4 241 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
55 Id. at 829.
56 295 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1961).
19751
COMMENTS
rule in Mapp v. Ohio,57 Gaitan brought a sec-
tion 2255 motion to vacate the judgment. The
district court rejected this motion for the fol-
lowing reason:
The question whether the marijuana was ad-
missible in evidence or should be excluded was
put squarely in issue in the criminal case. The
question was determined with pinpoint preci-
sion. The evidence was admitted and the judg-
ments and sentences became final .... [aInd a
change thereafter in the rule relating to the
admissibility of evidence obtained in that man-
ner did not arrest or suspend application of
the principle of res judicata to such judgments
and sentences. 58
The Supreme Court had refused to give Mapp
retroactive effect due to the enormous impact
such retroactivity would have had; thus, Mapp
did not truly apply to Gaitan's case.59 Al-
though the court in Gaitan spoke in terms of
res judicata, retroactive application of the
Mapp decision would have necessarily altered
the court's approach.
In United States v. SobeL60 the defendant
was convicted of conspiracy to commit espio-
nage. His ground of appeal under section 2255
was based upon the Supreme Court's decision
in Grunewald v. United States-' which held
that a prosecutor could not comment on a wit-
ness' prior invocation before a grand jury of
the privilege against self-incrimination. Sobell
contended that such comments at his trial had
seriously affected the fairness of the trial. The
Second Circuit dismissed the motion, however,
and reaffirmed the refusal of the courts to
57 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The exclusionary rule
requires that courts exclude from trial evidence
seized in violation of the fourth amendment.
58 295 F.2d at 280.
59 The Mapp decision did not apply retroactively
and thus the exclusionary rule did not affect the
decision in Gaitan. Thus a motion by Gaitan under§ 2255 could not have been successful. In cases fol-
lowing Mapp, however, some courts refused to
allow a fourth amendment violation to support a
motion under § 2255. These courts reasoned that
since fourth amendment violations only concerned
police procedure, such violations did not affect the
integrity of the fact finding process at trial.
Therefore the violations were not of such a griev-
ous nature as to support a motion under § 2255.
See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 237
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
60314 F2d 314 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
857 (1963).
61353 U.S. 391 (1957).
apply subsequent law to convictions already
final:
There is an inevitable attraction in the posi-
tion that a person convicted of a serious crime
should receive a new trial whenever a later
decision of the highest court indicates that,
with the benefit of hindsight, a different
course should have been followed at his trial
in any consequential respect. Yet for a court
to yield broadly to that attraction not only
would cause 'litigation in these criminal cases
[to) be interminable' 332 U.S. at 182..., but,
in the sole interest of those already convicted
of crime, would drastically impair the ability of
the Government to discharge the duty of pro-
tection which it owes to all its citizens.Q 2
Even had the court accepted Sobell's claim, the
alleged defect went to the procedure at trial
and neither to the statute under which he was
convicted nor to an element of proof necessary
for conviction. The appropriate relief for So-
bell, if the court had allowed his claim, would
have been a new trial. Courts do not favor
granting such relief after an extended lapse of
time. The unavailability of witnesses and the
staleness of the evidence would make such a
trial inconvenient and often unfair.
More recently, in Hardy v. United States,6 3
the dissent of Judge Bazelon foreshadowed the
Davis ruling. Hardy was convicted of violation
of the narcotics laws. He appealed on the basis
of the delay between the commission of the of-
fense and the arrest, claiming that it was un-
reasonably long. The court denied this conten-
tion on appeal, and Hardy was unable to
obtain a rehearing before the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court also denied his petition
for a writ of certiorari. After Hardy had ex-
hausted all appeals, the decision in Ross v.
United States"4 held a similar delay violative
62 314 F2d at 324. Even though the changes of
law in both Gaitan and Sobell were of constitu-
tional dimensions, the courts did not consider
themselves obligated to consider these claims under§ 2255. The courts, then, did not need to discuss
the retroactivity of these subsequent changes in
law since the grounds were not sufficient at that
time, even if they were to apply to the petitioner's
case. Courts had fairly broad discretion in consid-
ering motions under § 2255 until Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969) held that
every constitutional claim was sufficient for a mo-
tion under § 2255. See note 30 supra.
63 381 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
14 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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of due process. The court of appeals, in affirm-
ing the district court's denial of Hardy's sec-
tion 2255 motion on the basis of the Ross
opinion, stated that "issues disposed of on ap-
peal from the original judgment of conviction
will not be reviewed again under section
2255."65 Judge Bazelon dissented because he
believed that the petitioner had shown that the
claim was subject to collateral attack due to
the constitutional nature of the Ross decision,
that Ross applied retroactively, and that the
previous denial of the same contention by the
court of appeals was no bar to collateral attack
since res judicata did not apply. Judge Bazelon
concluded: "Since Ross intervened between
these appellants' original appeal and their mo-
tion under section 2255, and since Ross signif-
icantly changed the law in this area, it would
seem quite clear that Sanders entitles these ap-
pellants to a new hearing on their claim." 66
A comparison of the majority position with
that of the dissent in Hardy indicates the dif-
fering views on the significance of a prior de-
termination. The fact that Hardy consistently
raised the precise issue of unreasonable delay
sufficed to permit the majority to decide that
there had been no manifest injustice. They felt
that Hardy had had an adequate opportunity to
have his claim heard. Judge Bazelon, however,
saw the Ross decision as offering a new prece-
dent which would support a section 2255
motion where a change in law of constitutional
dimensions had occurred.
Several cases which consider the availability
of the privilege against self-incrimination in
cases where the party is seeking to avoid pay-
ment of taxes on illegal activities demonstrate
the inconsistencies that ultimately developed.
In United States v. Rodgers6e 7 defendant was
convicted of not paying the occupational tax
on wagering. A subsequent decision, Marchetti
v. United States,68 allowed the assertion of this
65 Different panels of judges within the same
circuit decided Ross and Hardy. Thus the Ross
decision would not control the decision of the
Hardy court. In addition the court in Ross specifi-
cally distinguished its facts from those in Hardy.
The distinction further supports the position that
the Ross decision did not create a change in law
sufficient to merit relief under § 2255 in Hardy's
case.
66 381 F.2d at 953.
67 288 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Okla. 1968).
68 390 U.S. 39 (1968). The Court in Marchetti
recognized that the imnoition nf 'uch a tax was a
privilege effectively to preclude criminal pun-
ishment for failure to pay the tax. The court
in Rodgers ruled that "decisional changes in
the law, even involving an interpretation of
the Constitution, do not justify relief by habeas
corpus or Section 2255." 69
In Eby v. United States70 defendant simi-
larly had been convicted for not paying trans-
fer taxes on marijuana transactions. The law
at that time stated that the defendant could not
assert the fifth amendment defense in such a
situation. The Eby court, too, held that the
subsequent change in law effected by Marchetti
did not afford relief to one previously
convicted.71
However, the Eighth Circuit in 1971 allowed
an identical section 2255 appeal in Scogin v.
United States.7 2 In 1967 Scogin had pleaded
guilty to acquiring marijuana without payment
of the transfer tax. He took no appeal but
rather filed a section 2255 motion following
the decision that the fifth amendment was a
complete defense to any prosecution for failure
to pay this tax. Since this motion to vacate
judgment was the first opportunity after the
change in law that the defendant had to plead
the fifth amendment privilege, the court held it
to be a timely assertion of the privilege. The
court concluded:
[We] are convinced that to allow one to con-
tinue to be penalized for conduct which is now
constitutionally immune from punishment
would contravene basic concepts of justice and
fairness.73
proper exercise of the taxing power of Congress.
The privilege against self-incrimination still at-
tached to such a tax, however, and enabled one to
avoid prosecution for failure to pay the tax.
69 288 F. Supp. at 58. The Rodgers court con-
tended that the guilt of the prisoner was not in
issue since the tax itself was valid. Since the peti-
tioner failed to utilize his fifth amendment privi-
lege, the court held that he should not be allowed
to subsequently invoke it after his admission of
guilt at trial.70286 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Okla. 1968).
71 The court reasoned that the judgment was al-
ready final and even if the decision in Marchetti
did apply to petitioner's case, Eby's failure to ap-
peal precluded raising the issue on a § 2255 motion.
72 446 F2d 416 (8th Cir. 1971).7 3 In contrast to Rodgers and Eby, moreover,
the decision in Scogin came in 1971 after the
Kaufman decision had required courts to hear
every constitutional claim under § 2255. The con-
stitutional basis of the Marchetti opinion, then,
made consideration of petitioner's claim more com-
pelling due to Kaufman.
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The court focused on the fact that the conduct
for which the defendant was presently incar-
cerated was now completely immune from pun-
ishment due to a constitutionally recognized
defense.
The de-criminalization of the action for
which the defendant had been convicted forms
a basis for distinction between two other cases
which involve a retroactive application of a
statutory construction. In Brough v. United
States74 the defendant was convicted for fail-
ure to register for the draft. This offense had
a five year statute of limitations and Brough
was convicted five years and five months after
his eighteenth birthday. The selective service
had employed a "continuing offense" theory to
secure this conviction-that is, that defendant
violated the law each day he failed to register,
with the five year statute of limitation running
from each violation. After the conclusion of
defendant's trial and appeal on this offense, the
Supreme Court in Toussie v. United States75
rejected this selective service continuing offense
theory and held that one must be indicted
within five years and five days of one's eight-
eenth birthday in order to be prosecuted within
the statute of limitations. The Seventh Circuit
gave retroactive effect to Toussie and allowed
Brought to present a section 2255 motion.
In Santana v. United States,70 however, the
defendant pleaded guilty to receipt of illegally
imported cocaine. The legal presumptions in
effect at that time, that importation of cocaine
and knowledge of that importation could be in-
ferred from possession, induced the defendant
to plead guilty. Subsequently, the decision in
Turner v. United States77 invalidated these
presumptions. Despite retroactive application
of Turner, however, the court in Santana
denied defendant's section 2255 motion. The
court found nothing to show that the guilty
pleas were invalid or unreliable. It held that
a court should not grant a new trial after a
fifteen year delay, and it feared a flood of sec-
tion 2255 applications. 78
Many courts remained reluctant to recognize
74454 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1971).
,5 397 U.S. 112 (1970).
76477 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
874 (1973).
77 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
78 The reasoning of the court in Santana must
be limited to the facts of that case, specifically the
a change in law as grounds for a motion under
section 2255. The decision in Odom v. United
States79 established the principle which the
Ninth Circuit applied in denying Davis' sec-
tion 2255 motion. In his case on appeal, peti-
tioner in Odom sought application of a new
test for insanity, developed after his convic-
tion. Odom had pleaded insanity at his trial,
and therefore the court said:
The law in this circuit is clear that when a
matter had been decided adversely on appeal
from a conviction, it cannot be litigated again
on a § 2255 motion.80
Thus, the Ninth Circuit considered only
whether the court had reviewed the issue on
appeal. Since the courts had fully considered
the issue of insanity at trial and on appeal, the
Ninth Circuit decided to bar a section 2255
motion despite the new law that had developed
subsequent to the court's decision.81
Thus the cases prior to Davis displayed a
certain inconsistency and vacillation with re-
gard to whether a subsequent change in law
would allow a motion under section 2255
Much of this confusion among the lower fed-
eral courts arose from the expansion of collat-
eral grounds for relief through the more ex-
pansive construction of constitutional rights
relating to various aspects of the trial. While
voluntary guilty plea and the extensive lapse of
time between conviction and the appeal. Two years
earlier the same circuit in United States v. Liguori,
438 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1971), considered the effect
of Turner for the purposes of § 2255. Liguori
pleaded not guilty and was convicted at trial; he
did not challenge the validity of the presumptions
in effect at that time on his appeal. The Second
Circuit, however, did not feel this failure to appeal
barred him from raising the validity of these pre-
sumptions in issue on a § 2255 motion. The court
stated that the fact that the government had offered
no proof for several key elements of the offense(since Turner had invalidated essential presump-
tions) made continued confinement of Liguori unjust.
79 455 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1972).
so 455 F.2d at 160.
81 The Odorn court spoke of issues raised on
appeal without regard to the law as it applied to
those issues at the time of appeal. The Court in
Da-is rejected this issue-oriented approach and
held that when significantly new law appears,
courts must consider the effect of the new law
upon a petitioner's claim under § 2255. It was of
no significance to the ,Davis Court that a peti-
tioner had raised the same issue on appeal since
the Court contended that a change in law gave the
petitioner a totally new claim.
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trends are difficult to determine in this area,
cotqrts have been more willing recently to con-
sider a significant change in law sufficient for
a motion under section 2255.82
CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF CHANGE OF LAW
Questions as to the scope and impact of the
Davis decision still remain in light of the com-
plex nature of the problem dealt with in that
decision. To adequately determine the extent of
the Davis decision insofar as it allows a mo-
tion under section 2255 when there has been a
change in law, courts must consider the type
of change, the way in which the change af-
fected the disposition of the defendant's case,
and the procedures which the petitioner fol-
lowed after conviction. An analysis of the
Davis decision reveals that the Supreme Court
left open the issue of how authoritative the
change in law must be. Therefore, courts may
require some threshold of authoritativeness be-
fore the subsequent change in law will suffice
for the purposes of section 2255. Cases follow-
ing Davis also discuss the issue of retroactivity
and exhaustion of remedies as possible limita-
tions on the impact of the Davis opinion. The
Court in Davis established no adequate stand-
ards to be used by future courts to determine
when a change in law should apply to petition-
er's case under a section 2255 motion. These
standards should deal with the issue of the au-
thoritativeness of the subsequent decision and
the significance of the decision as applied to the
merits of petitioner's case.
With reference to this first standard Justice
Rhenquist in his dissent in Davis points out
the difficulty in holding that a court should
consider the Fox decision as a change in law
with respect to the Davis case:
Thus the real focus of petitioner's argument
must be that Fox is the governing law. But
in that regard, I cannot see why a decision by
a single panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit should be considered a 'law' of
the United States. In fact the Court of Appeals
itself stated that its decision in Fox had not
overruled Davis, pointing out that an en banc
decision of the Court of Appeals would be nec-
essary for such a result. Thus the Court today
categorizes as a 'law of the United States' a
82 See, e.g., People ex rel. Soto v. United States,
504 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1974).
decision which is still open to question within
the Court of Appeals' own jurisdiction.S3
When the Ninth Circuit receives Davis' Sec-
tion 2255 motion on remand it will face ex-
actly the same issue it decided upon appeal, the
application and interpretation of the decision
in Gutknecht to the facts of Davis. Thus, al-
though the Fox decision intervened, the Ninth
Circuit may refuse to follow Fox when it
considers the merits of petitioner's Section 2255
motion. Such inconsistent decisions by differ-
ent appellate panels within a circuit are per-
fectly permissible. 84 Only an en banc hearing
of the Ninth Circuit would resolve this con-
flict, but the Supreme Court's remand did not
mandate such a hearing.
By categorizing this type of decision as a
change in law sufficient to merit an appeal
under section 2255, the Court in Davis sub-
stantially broadened the grounds available for
relief. Not only is a change in law now suffi-
cient for section 2255 purposes, but the change
need not bind the district court hearing the
motion. In addition, although the inconsistent
change in law in the Davis case came within
the same circuit, Justice Rehnquist suggested
that a decision from the Fourth Circuit, for
example, may allow a section 2255 motion in
the Ninth Circuit.83 The result would be pris-
oners searching among the circuits to find a
more liberal interpretation of a rule or statute
which would enable them to raise an effective
section 2255 motion. Intra-circuit conflicts
might allow prisoners convicted under the
stricter decision to use the more liberal rule to
obtain relief. All of these contingencies may
not develop, but the possibility certainly re-
mains under the Davis opinion.
A requirement that the subsequent decision
changing the lav be binding upon the court
hearing the section 2255 motion would limit
the effect of the Davis decision.8 G The major-
ity in Davis addressed the issue of authorita-
83 417 U.S. at 360 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
84 In Davis the panel consisted of Circuit
Judges Chambers and Kilkenny along with Dis-
trict Judge Powell. Circuit Judges Merrell and
Duniway and District Judge Crocker made up the
panel in Fox.
85 417 U.S. at 361 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86 See Comment, Subsequent Inconsistent Inter-
pretation of a Statute as a Basis for Collateral




tiveness only insofar as they held that the Fox
decision permitted a motion to be raised under
section 2255. Fox, however, as noted by Justice
Rehnquist, did not control the decision in
Davis. Therefore, if courts were to require a
controlling change in law before permitting a
motion under section 2255, a further modifica-
tion of Davis would develop.
One can read Davis as allowing a non-au-
thoritative change in law to permit a section
2255 motion only when the change occurred in
the same circuit. This interpretation of the
Davis decision would maintain the independent
character of the various circuits. Even accept-
ing this latter reading of the Davis decision,
however, intra-circuit conflicts between panels
would still pose problems. The district court
when hearing Davis' motion on remand, may
refuse to follow the Fox decision and summar-
ily dismiss the motion. Such a procedure would
be a superfluous exercise for the prisoner and
the courts.
With reference to the second standard, the
effect of the change in law upon petitioner's
case is also an area open to questions. If the
court applied the Fox decision in the Davis
case, it would then release Davis. Limiting
Davis to cases where application of the subse-
quent change in law would result in release
would impose a further constraint on the im-
pact of the Davis decision. Such a reading of
the Davis opinion finds support in the lan-
guage of the Davis majority:
In this case, the petitioner's contention is that
the decision in Gutknecht . . . as interpreted
... in the Fox case ... established that his in-
duction order was invalid under the Selective
Service Act and that he could not be lawfully
convicted for failure to comply with that
order. If this contention is well-taken, then
Davis' conviction and punishment are for an
act that the law does not make criminal.
There can be no room for doubt that such a
circumstance 'inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice' and 'presents excep-
tional circumstances' that justify collateral re-
lief under § 2255.87
Thus the language in the Davis opinion sup-
ports a position that if a subsequent change in
law would result in a finding that the actions
for which the person was convicted are no
87 417 U.S. at 346.
longer criminal, then relief under section 2255
would be available. Allowing relief in these sit-
uations fulfills the command of Hia that a
"fundamental defect" or "exceptional circum-
stances" be present.
The question then remains whether the facts
of Davis truly represent the limit of the hold-
ing. A subsequent change in law could apply
to a petitioner, yet it might not result in his
complete release. Such a situation would arise
when, for example, a subsequent decision estab-
lished a new test for criminal responsibility.
The change, if applied to petitioner's case,
would require a new trial, perhaps long after
the alleged crime. If the change is constitu-
tional and applies retroactively, 8 then an ade-
quate motion under section 2255 could be
raised since all constitutional claims may be
raised on collateral attack.89
If the change in law is statutory, however,
the court need not grant a motion under sec-
tion 2255 even if the change applies retroac-
tively. The Davis decision did not require that
courts allow every change in law to suffice for
the purposes of section 2255. The Supreme
Court only indicated that the facts of Davis
permitted a motion under section 2255. Several
cases following Davis provide some indication
of the direction in which the courts are mov-
ing and of the considerations they are taking
into account when deciding whether to allow a
motion under section 2255 after a change in law.
88 Justice Rehnquist contended that retroactivity
of a subsequent change in law was not required
for a sufficient motion under § 2255. The majority
however, specifically stated that the retroactivity
of Gutknecht is yet to be decided. Later cases
citing Davis refer to retroactivity as an essential
element for relief under § 2255.
89 Justice Black argued in his dissent in Kauf-
inun that not every constitutional claim may be
sufficient for collateral relief. He pointed to the
language of § 2255 which requires that there be
"such a denial or infringment of the constitutional
rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment
vulnerable to collateral attack." From this lan-
guage he concluded that not every constitutional
claim is "such a denial" of rights. Black contended
that before Mapp almost every constitutional vio-
lation "played a central role in assuring that the
trial would be a reliable means of testing guilt."
394 U.S. at 237 (Black, J., dissenting). Black,
then, would exclude fourth amendment attacks
from § 2255 relief and require a claim that would
cast some doubt on the guilt of the petitioner. See
also Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral




Quinn v. United States9o and Joe v. United
States9' both concerned the application of the
Supreme Court decision in Keeble v. United
States9 2 to cases tried and finalized prior to
this decision. Both Quinn and Joe were Indi-
ans who were convicted under the Major
Crimes Act. Prior to Keeble, courts had con-
strued this statute strictly, preventing trial
courts from giving lesser included offense in-
structions to the jury. Courts reasoned that
they had jurisdiction only over those offenses
specifically enumerated in the Major Crimes
Act, and therefore, they deemed it beyond their
jurisdiction to provide instructions on other
crimes not listed in the act. Thus neither
Quinn nor Joe had the benefit of these lesser
included offense instructions at trial and were
convicted of the major crime.93 The Keeble de-
cision, coming after their convictions and un-
successful appeals, held that a statute which re-
quired that Indians be tried just like state
criminals, required a court to give lesser in-
cluded offense instructions at trial. The Court
held that a federal district judge with jurisdic-
tion over an enumerated offense also has juris-
diction over non-enumerated offenses that fall
within the lesser included offense category.
The Keeble Court reasoned that denial of this
right to lesser included offense instructions
would present serious constitutional difficulties.
The Tenth Circuit when considering Joe's
subsequent section 2255 motion recognized
that "Keeble avowedly did not establish any
new constitutional doctrine" and also that Joe's
"conviction, affirmed on appeal, was, to be
sure, in consonance with contemporaneous in-
terpretations of § 1153." 94 Yet, applying Kee-
ble retroactively, the Tenth Circuit permitted
Joe's section 2255 motion. They read the
Davis opinion as reminding "us that the stat-
ute [Section 2255] was designed to empower a
sentencing court to correct a judgment to con-
form to an intervening change in the law af-
fecting the fundamental rights of a convicted
defendant." o5 Thus the court in Joe required a
90 499 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1974).
91510 F2d 1038 (10th Cir. 1975).
n2412 U.S. 205 (1973), rev'g 459 F.2d 757 (10th
Cir. 1972).
O3Joe was charged with rape, whereas Quinn
was charged with larceny.
510 F. 2d at 1042.
95 Id.
retroactive application of the change in law
and further required that the change affect a
fundamental right of the convicted defendant.99
The Tenth Circuit also found significant the
fact that Joe had exhausted his appellate proce-
dures on this precise issue. The court in Joe
recognized that had Joe's case been heard
eleven months later, when the Keeble case was
granted certiorari, the court would have cer-
tainly applied the Keeble decision. Since Joe
had argued the propriety of lesser included of-
fense instructions on appeal and in his petition
for a writ of certiorari, the Tenth Circuit
held the subsequent decision in Keeble should
apply to Joe's case. Therefore, when the al-
leged error is statutory, the Tenth Circuit in-
terpreted Davis to require that a petitioner
must have exhausted his appellate remedies be-
fore requesting relief-under section 2255 due
to a subsequent change in law.
In contrast to Joe, the Eighth Circuit in
Quinn denied retroactive application of the
Keeble decision in that circuit. However, they
affirmed "the district court order denying
Quinn's Section 2255 motion for another
reason." 97 They found Quinn's failure to
request a lesser included offense instruction
fatal to his claim. Unlike Keeble, Quinn was
entitled to a lesser included offense instruction
at his trial since, according to the Eighth Cir-
cuit, the offense he committed was specifically
enumerated in the federal statute. Thus the
court of appeals did not see Keeble as chang-
ing the law as applied to the facts of Quinn.
The thrust of the opinion, however, indicated
that retroactivity of a change in law is essential
and that exhaustion of remedies and proce-
dures at trial and through appeal is also
necessary.98
Finally, United States v. Travers9 0 deals
96 Keeble did not consider a constitutional claim,
but it did allow lesser included offense instructions
by interpreting § 1153 to avoid constitutional diffi-
culties which the court thought might develop if
the denial of lesser included offense instructions
continued.
97 499 F.2d at 795.
98 The court clearly implied that denial of retro-
active effect to Keeble in that circuit was enough
to defeat a § 2255 motion. The fact that Quinn
failed to ask for the proper instructions and was,
therefore, denied relief indicates, moreover, the de-
sire of the court to have defendants exhaust appel-
late remedies.
99 No. 74-1737 (2d Cir., December 16, 1974).
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with the precise issue raised by Justice
Rehnquist in his dissent in Davis concerning
the effect of United States v. Maze'00 on prior
convictions for mail fraud. The Maze decision
relied on a narrow construction of the federal
conspiracy law recognized by a minority of
federal circuits prior to Maze. Justice Rehn-
quist predicted that the Davis opinion would
seem "to provide full opportunity for all de-
fendants convicted under the Mail Fraud Act
in the circuits whose view was not accepted to
relitigate those convictions in a section 2255
proceeding." 101 Travers was just such a pro-
ceeding.
Travers was convicted of mail fraud under
the broad interpretation of the mail fraud stat-
ute applied by a majority of the circuits prior
to Maze. At the time of the Maze decision
Travers had already served his sentence, and
therefore had brought a writ in error coram
nobis. The court in Travers acknowledged that
Davis involved section 2255, but they noted
that the "standards applied in federal coram
nobis are similar" to those of section 2255.102
Thus they looked to Davis to determine the
effect of Maze on the conviction of Travers.
The court found that Davis clearly permitted
an attack on a conviction by a section 2255
motion when a subsequent change occurred in
the laws of the United States. However, the
court also contended that the Davis opinion left
open the question of a requirement of retroac-
tivity. In support of this view, they pointed to
a footnote in Davis which read:
In the absence of a decision by the Court of
Appeals on the merits of the petitioner's con-
tentions, this case is not an appropriate vehicle
to consider whether the Gutknecht decision
has retroactive application or whether the Fox
case was correctly decided by the Court of
Appeals.' 03
Thus the Second Circuit in Travers contended
that the Ninth Circuit in the Davis case had
not yet determined whether Gutknecht should
be applied retroactively. The implication is that
a decision denying retroactivity to Gutknecht
would preclude relief for Davis under section
2255 since the change in law promulgated by
100414 U.S. 395 (1974).
101 417 U.S. at 366 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102 No. 74-1734 at page 808, n.1.
103 417 U.S. at 341 n.12.
the Gutknecht decision would then be inappli-
cable to petitioner's case.
Linkletter v. Walker0 4 established certain
standards for determining the retroactivity of
any new law. These criteria are: (1) the pur-
pose to be served by the new law, (2) the ex-
tent of reliance upon the old standard, and (3)
the effect of the new standard upon the admin-
istration of justice. Courts, therefore, must test
each change of law against these criterea and
determine if the new law should apply to prior
cases. Once a court determines that a change
in law should apply retroactively, however,
such determination does not guarantee a suc-
cessful motion under section 2255. The Trav-
ers court went beyond retroactivity and re-
quired other factors to be present before
granting relief under section 2255. The man-
ner in which the Travers court handled peti-
tioner's claim after granting retroactivity to
the Maze decision delineates these factors.
Looking to Maze, the Travers court found
that the "Maze decision was no thunderclap like
those that have given rise to Supreme Court
rulings limiting the temporal effect of constitu-
tional decisions on criminal procedure.... 105
Thus the Travers court held the Maze decision
to be retroactive in the Second Circuit and
proceeded to deal with its effect on Travers'
conviction.
Two factors strongly influenced the court to
grant Travers relief in this case. First, in view
of Maze, Travers was convicted and punished
for an act that the law did not now make
criminal. 10 This type of change made prior
104381 U.S. 618 (1965). Courts have denied
retroactive effect to cases such as Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) which established significant
extensions of constitutional rights and whose effect
would be enormous. Where the change is not so
dramatic, or where the purpose of the new enact-
ment is essential, courts will give retroactive effect
to a new development in the law.
A finding of retroactivity is an essential initial
step to a successful motion under § 2255 based
upon a change in law. If the court grants retroac-
tivity to a new decision then the question still re-
mains whether the court should grant § 2255 relief
based upon this new law. Although some criteria
may overlap, the question of retroactivity and the
sufficiency of the § 2255 motion are two separate
determinations for the court.
105 No. 74-1737 at 810.
106 The government argued that they could have
proven the elements of conspiracy but thought it
unnecessary due to the statutory construction then
in effect in that circuit. To allow § 2255 relief
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convictions under the statute "inherently result
in a complete miscarriage of justice" and
"present exceptional circumstances" which jus-
tify relief under section 2255.107 The fact that
the new interpretation made the punished con-
duct now totally free from sanctions presented
a clear case of manifest injustice for this
court.
The second factor was Travers' full utiliza-
tion of the appellate process. Applying the
holding in Sunal v. Large08 to these facts the
court reasoned that:
[W]e must take Sunal as meaning that when
the error is one which can be rectified by
proper construction of a criminal statute with-
out resort to the Constitution, a claim that a
conviction was had without proof of all the
elements required by the statute is not a con-
stitutional claim as that phrase is used in re-
spect of collateral attack, and that, in conse-
quence, collateral relief will rarely be accorded
to those who, even for apparently good reasons,
did not exhaust the possibilities of direct
review.109
This reasoning comports with the other cases
following Davis which have required full use
of appellate procedure in order to raise a statu-
tory claim on a section 2255 motion.
The final argument raised by the Govern-
ment in Travers may help clarify the precise
nature of the statutory change in law that a
petitioner must assert in order to satisfy a sec-
tion 2255 motion. The Second Circuit in
United States v. Tarrago"10 had held that the
newly developed test for criminal responsibility
established by that circuit in United States v.
Freeman"1' should apply to cases still open to
direct review, thereby implying that this deci-
sion would be unavailable for purposes of col-
lateral attack. The government argued that
then, they contended, would free a prisoner who
could have been proven guilty had the government
known that proof of those elements was required.
However, since the alleged acts of Travers were
not criminal after Maze, the court allowed the mo-
tion. Travers may have been guilty, but he was
not guilty of the act with which the government
charged him.
107 Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428
(1962).
108332 U.S. 174 (1947).
109 No. 74-1737 at 817.
110 398 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
111 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
this decision was a precedent for not applying
changes in law retroactively, but the court in
Travers looked to the effect of the change in
law on the case before them. They noted:
Furthermore application of the Freeman rule
to convictions already final would by no
means certainly have resulted in acquittals;
rather it would have led to holding, or at-
tempting to hold, hosts of new trials, in many
instances long after the event."12
Thus the Second Circuit's refusal to apply the
rule in Freeman in cases of collateral attacks
did not bar the Travers court from so applying
the decision in Maze. The Freeman decision
would only allow the defendant the benefit of a
new test for criminal responsibility at trial.
Even with the application of the Freeman deci-
sion to a petitioner's case, a new trial would be
necessary to determine the case under the new
test. Applying the Maze decision to a prior
case, however, would reverse a petitioner's
conviction.
The Maze decision established that conduct
for which prisoners had been convicted under
the statutory construction prevalent in most
circuits prior to Maze was no longer criminal.
Thus release was appropriate for prisoners
such as Travers. Such a remedy eases tremen-
dously the administrative burden upon the
criminal justice system by avoiding continued
litigation of petitioner's case. The Travers
court also considered it a grievous violation of
a prisoner's rights to be confined when a new
law has made the conduct for which a prisoner
was convicted no longer criminal.
The decisions following Davis, therefore, in-
dicate that a petitioner must show more than a
mere change in law on some aspect of his case
in order to be successful on a motion under
section 2255. When a petitioner asserts a stat-
utory ground for relief due to a change in law,
courts have required that he initially demon-
strate that a court should give retroactive ef-
fect to this change.
Additionally, petitioner must demonstrate his
full utilization of direct appellate procedures."3
"12 No. 74-1737 at 820.
113 Courts in the past required a petitioner to
exhaust his appellate procedures before they would
hear a constitutional claim. Kaufman invalidated
this requirement by allowing a constitutional claim
to be raised in a motion under § 2255 even if peti-
19751
COMMENTS
If the grounds of the post-conviction relief are
statutory then courts following Davis have
indicated that petitioner must have raised the
issue on appeal in order for the court to con-
sider it on a motion to vacate judgment under
section 2255.
Finally, the petitioner must show that the
change in law will have a fundamental effect
upon his prior conviction. If the subsequent
change completely invalidates the conviction,
then courts should grant relief. If, however,
the effect of the subsequent change would be to
require a new trial, then the court may deny
relief if it does not consider the violated right
to be fundamental.
Courts will need to develop and discuss this
final point more fully. The court in Joe al-
lowed relief when the remedy available to Joe
would be a new trial with appropriate lesser
included offense instructions given. The deci-
sion in Travers, however, required that com-
plete release of the petitioner be the result
when the court applies the new interpretation.
In keeping with the rationales underlying ha-
beas corpus and section 2255 relief, courts still
must look to the decision in Hill for the stand-
ard to employ. Habeas corpus and section
2255 were designed to alleviate cases where se-
rious injustice would result by the continued
confinement of the petitioning prisoner. Once a
court has decided that the new law should
apply retroactively, it still must consider the
effect of this change of law upon the petition-
tioner had failed to raise it on appeal. Thus courts
following Davis may invalidate this exhaustion
requirement for statutory claims; however, at the
present time courts have indicated that they do
require exhaustion of appellate remedies.
er's case to see if such serious injustice would
be done by a failure to grant relief. If failure
to apply the subsequent change in law would
produce "fundamental defects which result in a
complete miscarriage of justice," 114 then
courts must grant relief.
People ex rel. Soto v. United States" 5 spoke
in terms of "fundamental rights," an analysis
which may prevail. Under this analysis a
change in law which established that a defend-
ant was denied what courts conclude was a
fundamental right, would require relief. The
court in Travers, however, viewed actual effect
as the key factor to consider in deciding
whether to permit relief. The Travers deci-
sion indicates that unlike constitutional attacks
which may be made whatever the effect on the
trial would have been, a statutory claim must
be of such a nature as to result in the release
of the prisoner by applying the new law to pe-
titioner's case.
Whatever the final determination of these is-
sues will be, the cases succeeding Davis have
posited some parameters for the availability of
section 2255 relief, despite the fears of Justice
Rehnquist that courts must now grant un-
bounded collateral relief. As Judge Friendly
noted in Travers: "Cassandra-like predictions
in dissent are not a sure guide to the breadth
of the majority's ruling. . . ." 116 Davis cer-
tainly offers increased availability of federal
post-conviction relief, but it provides this relief
in keeping with the intent of habeas corpus-
to cure grave injustices when no other remedy
exists.
114 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962).
115 504 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1974).
116 No. 74-1737 at 810.
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EXCLUSION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE
AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
Today, sixty-one years after the Supreme
Court of the United States first imposed the
"exclusionary rule" on the federal court
system ' and fourteen years after the rule was
made applicable in state courts, 2 the separate
questions of when prosecution evidence is
seized in violation of fourth and fourteenth
amendment rights3 and when it should be inad-
missible at a criminal trial remain matters of
controversy. Not only have several justices of
the Supreme Court, including Chief Justice
Berger, expressed misgivings about the exclu-
sionary rule,4 but recent decisions handed
down by the Court would appear to limit the
application of the rule at criminal trials.5
I Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 This comment will focus on the application of
the exclusionary rule in preliminary hearings as a
sanction used to enforce the constitutional prohibi-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures
found in the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
Although courts have applied the exclusionary rule
to evidence other than the products of unreasonable
searches and seizures-to evidence offered in vio-
lation of fifth amendment rights, for example-this
comment will examine cases involving such other
evidence only when they are relevant to considera-
tion of the exclusionary rule's function in the
search and seizure area.
4 See Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger,
C. J. dissenting), in which he proposed that Con-
gress create an alternative to the exclusionary rule.
See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 510 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), for Justice Blackmun's
view that the fourth amendment supports no ex-
clusionary rule.
5See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973), in which the Court held that in the case
of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the
person is not only an exception to the warrant re-
quirement of the fourth amendment but is also a
"reasonable" search under that amendment. See
also Schueckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973), in which the Court was urged to hold that
the legality of a search and seizure by state
officers may not be relitigated in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding. Although the court disposed of
the case by deciding that the search was a consen-
sual one, Chief Justice Berger and Justices Powell
and Rehnquist thought the Court should have held
federal habeas corpus to be unavailable in such
cases. Justice Blackmun concurred in their view
While the Supreme Court has been reconsid-
ering whether the fourth and fourteenth
amendments even require an exclusionary rule,
Congress, the federal courts and many state
courts and legislative bodies have been ponder-
ing whether the exclusionary rule, as set forth
in earlier Supreme Court decisions, applies in
all criminal proceedings.6 Time and again-in
relation to grand jury and post-conviction de-
liberations, for example-the question has
arisen whether the fourth and fourteenth
amendments require exclusion of evidence at
criminal proceedings other than trials. 7
but thought the question should have been reserved
for decision in another case.
Other limitations have been placed on the appli-
cability of the exclusionary rule in a criminal trial.
In order to challenge the unconstitutionality of a
search and seizure, for example, a defendant must
allege a legitimate interest of some kind in the
premises searched or the materials seized. Brown
v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973). Also, the
exclusionary rule does not prevent the use of evi-
dence to impeach defendants who have chosen to
testify at their own trials. Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
6 For a general discussion of how the exclusion-
ary rule relates to essentially non-criminal pro-
ceedings see Note, Admissibility of Illegally Ob-
tained Evidence it No;-Criminal Proceedings, 22
U. FLA. L. REv. 38 (1969).
7With regard to grand jury proceedings, the
Supreme Court held in United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974), that a witness summoned to
appear and testify before a grand jury could not
refuse to answer questions on the ground that they
were based on evidence obtained from an unlawful
search and seizure. That decision was the latest in
a series of Supreme Court holdings recognizing
the general freedom grand juries have under the
Constitution to consider whatever evidence is
available to them, whether legally or illegally ob-
tained, and whether or not the evidence would be
admissible at a criminal trial. The Supreme Court
has also held that an indictment need not be over-
turned simply because the grand jury returning it
considered hearsay evidence, Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), or evidence obtained
in violation of the defendanes privilege against
self-incrimination, Lawn v. United States, 355
U.S. 339 (1958). Accord, United States v. Blue,
384 U.S. 251 (1966) (dictum) ; see generally, 8 J.
WIGMoRE, EviDENcE § 2184a (McNaughton rev.
1961) ; R. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 167 n.36 (2d
ed. 1972).
The majority opinion in Costello contained the
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This comment will focus on the exclusion at
'the preliminary hearing of evidence seized in
violation of fourth and fourteenth amendment
rights, giving particular emphasis to state
practices. Under federal statutory law, objec-
tions to evidence on the ground that it has
following explanation of why the Supreme Court
declined to establish a rule permitting defendants
in federal criminal cases to challenge indictments
on the ground that they are not supported by ade-
quate or competent evidence:
No persuasive reasons are advanced for estab-
lishing such a rule. It would run counter to
the whole history of the grand jury institu-
tion, in which laymen conduct their inquiries
unfettered by technical rules. Neither justice
nor the concept of a fair trial requires such a
change. In a trial on the merits, defendants
are entitled to a strict observance of all rules
designed to bring about a fair verdict. Defend-
ants are not entitled, however, to a rule which
would result in interminable delay but add
nothing to the assurance of a fair trial.
350 U.S. at 364.
One constitutional limitation on the power of
grand juries to consider whatever evidence is
available to them is that the fourth and fourteenth
amendments provide protection against a subpoena
duces tecum too sweeping in its terms to be re-
garded as reasonable. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906).
Also, in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970),
Congress enacted a statutory exception to the gen-
eral federal rule allowing grand juries to consider
illegally obtained evidence. Where evidence has
been obtained by wiretapping or electronic surveil-
ance prohibited by the act, the use of such evi-
dence in any grand jury investigation, or in any
other criminal proceeding at the federal or state
level, is generally prohibited. See Gelbard v.
United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
In states that still retain the grand jury, the
typical rule is that indictments are not voided, de-
spite introduction of evidence which would have
been excluded at trial, as long as sufficient compe-
tent evidence to support the indictment was re-
ceived by the grand jury. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 939.6(b) (West 1970); N.Y. CODE CRIM.
PROC. § 210.35 (McKinney 1958), analyzed in R.
PITLER, NEW YORK CRIMINAL PRACTICE UNDER
THE CPL 400 (1972). Some states also have en-
acted statutes with provisions that conform gen-
erally to those in the section of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act found above. See,
e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-5 (1973) and N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. § 4506(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
With regard to exclusion after conviction, the
few cases on the subject are split. Compare Ver-
dugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 609-13 (9th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925 (1970)
(where use of illegally seized evidence at sentenc-
ing would provide a great incentive to searches
and seizures in violation of the fourth amendment,
the evidence must be disregarded in sentencing)
with Von Pickrell v. People, 163 Colo. 591, 431
P.2d 1003 (1967) and United States v. Schipani,
been acquired by unlawful means are not prop-
erly made at a federal preliminary hearing.8
While some state courts and legislatures have
adopted a similar rule,9 a significant number of
other states are allowing exclusion at the pre-
liminary hearing upon motion of the accused. 0
315 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd 435 F.2d 26(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971),
noted in 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 172 (1971) and 71
COLUM. L. REv. 1102 (1971) (evidence obtained in
violation of fourth amendment can be used at sen-
tencing since need for it outweighs deterrent effect
of excluding such evidence). See also In re Marti-
nez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 463 P.2d 734, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382
(1970), in which the court held, despite a strong
dissent, that the exclusionary rule is applicable to
parole revocation proceedings. Justice Tobriner, in
the majority opinion, reasoned that the incremen-
tal deterrent effect of not extending the rule to
those proceedings would be less important than the
"social consequences" of extension. The same con-
clusion was reached in United States ex. rel.
Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir.
1970), noted in 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 111 (1970), al-
though each of the judges deciding the case deliv-
ered a separate opinion.
s Rule 5.1 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides in pertinent part:
Objections to evidence on the ground that it
was acquired by unlawful means are not prop-
erly made at the preliminary examination.
Motions to suppress must be made to the trial
court.
FED. R. Cnim. P. 5.1 (a).
This rule represents a codification of a long-
prevailing practice whereby evidence has been con-
sidered at federal court preliminary examinations
without regard to the legality of the means by
which it was acquired. Even under the less specific
language found in the statute prior to its amend-
ment in 1972, a federal magistrate had no authority
in a preliminary hearing to determine the admissi-
bility of illegally seized evidence. FED. R. Cem. P.
5.1 (Advisory Committee Notes); Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
9 For statutory and quasi-statutory state law di-
rectly prohibiting exclusion at the preliminary
hearing see, e.g., 17 ARIz. R. Casm. P. 5.3(b)
(1973) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. 971-31(5) (b) (1971).
For state cases directly and indirectly opposing ex-
clusion at the preliminary hearing see, e.g., Davis v.
State, 65 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1953); Thompson v.
General Finance Co., 205 Kan. 76, 468 P.2d 269
(1970); State v. Earley, 192 Kan. 167, 386 P.2d
189 (1963) ; McIntyre v. Sands, 128 Kan. 521, 278
P. 761 (1929); State v. Crouch, 353 S.W.2d 597
(Mo. 1962); Ex parte Cloud, 18 S.W.2d 562
(Mo. 1929) ; Delay v. Brainard, 182 Neb. 509, 156
N.W.2d 14 (1968); Harmer v. State, 120 Neb.
374, 238 N.W. 356 (1931); State v. Garcia, 79
N.M. 367, 443 P.2d 860 (1968); State v. Harris,
44 Okla. Crim. 116, 279 P. 925 (1929) ; McCurdy
v. State, 39 Okla. Crim. 310, 264 P. 925 (1928).
10 For state statutes authorizing exclusion at the
preliminary hearing see CAL. EvID. CODE § 300
(West 1966) ; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(f)
(West 1954) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 109-3(e),
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STATE PRACTICES
Since state courts and legislatures have
been operating under the exclusionary rule im-
posed by Mapp, state developments must be
seen from the point of view of diverse and
conflicting pressures. On the one hand, there is
the pressure to conform to the viewpoint of the
Supreme Court, which has recognized only a
limited constitutional right to a preliminary hear-
ing 1 ' and has refrained from holding that the
exclusionary rule applies at such proceedings. On
the other hand, there is the pressure generated
by the widely held conviction that states can go
further than the Supreme Court in furnishing
rights to the accused; that states can be labo-
ratories of reform ultimately providing the Su-
preme Court with the data necessary for the
reexamination of its own policies.
In coping with these competing pressures,
courts and legislatures within various states
have come into conflict over the relative merits
of arguments for and against exclusion at the
preliminary hearing. State legislatures have
114-12 (1973). For state cases lending support
to exclusion at the preliminary hearing see e.g.,
State v. Jacobson, 106 Ariz. 129, 471 P.2d 1021
(1970); Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d
812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958); Rogers v. Superior
Court, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 291 P.2d 929 (1955) ; Pinniz-
zotto v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d 582, 65
Cal. Rptr. 74 (1968); Hernandez v. Superior
Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 20, 299 P.2d 678 (1956) ;
People v. Schuber, 71 Cal. App. 2d 773, 163 P.2d
498 (1945); State v. Wilson, 55 Haw. 314, 519
P.2d 228 (1974) ; Martinez v. State, 90 Idaho 229,
409 P.2d 426 (1965) ; People v. Taylor, 50 Ill. 2d
136, 277 N.E2d 878 (1972) ; People v. Asta, 337
Mich. 590, 60 N.W.2d 472 (1953); People v.
Maire, 42 Mich. App. 32, 201 N.W.2d 318 (1972) ;
Goldsmith v. Sheriff, 85 Nev. 295, 454 P.2d 86(1969); People ex rel. Ruppert v. Hoy, 50 Misc.
2d 326, 270 N.Y.S.2d 647, aff'd 25 App. Div. 2d
884, 270 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1966); People v. Weiss,
147 Misc. 595, 261 N.Y.S. 646 (Mag. Ct. 1932).
' ZThe Supreme Court has rejected the conten-
tion that all accused persons have a constitutional
right to a preliminary hearing ever since Lem
Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913). Recently,
however, the Court did hold that the fourth amend-
ment requires a preliminary hearing as a prere-
quisite to an "extended restraint of liberty" prior
to trial. Gerstein v. Pugh, -U.S-, 95 S.Ct.
854, 863 (1975). The Gerstein Court refused to
overturn Lent Woon, holding that a preliminary
hearing is not a prerequisite to prosecution by
information (or, presumably, by indictment). Id. at
865. A preliminary hearing is required only for
those suspects who suffer restraint on liberty other
than simply the condition that they appear for
trial. Id. at 869 n.26.
passed laws on the subject only to have them
declared void by state courts. Courts in turn
have allowed exclusion, or favored it in dicta,
only to have legislatures pass laws specifically
opposing it. Consideration of how state courts
and legislatures who have participated in the
debate on exclusion have decided the matter for
their states is important to any assessment of
the viability of applying the exclusionary rule
at the preliminary hearing and the likelihood
of its application in a greater number of states
and, ultimately, the federal system.
This comment's survey of state practices
with regard to exclusion at the preliminary
hearing opens with the recent decision of State
v. Wilson, 12 a Hawaiian case which not only
contains an unusually thoughtful discussion of
the considerations that favor and oppose exclu-
sion but also provides an excellent picture of a
state court struggling to determine the role it
should play under the Constitution in extend-
ing rights to accused persons. In Wilson, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii decided an appeal
by the prosecution from a ruling of a state dis-
trict court that it had jurisdiction to entertain
a motion to suppress at a preliminary hearing.
Appellees were charged, pursuant to an infor-
mation, with promotion of a detrimental drug.
A preliminary hearing was held, where the
state called its only witness, a police sergeant,
who testified regarding the execution of a
search warrant upon appellees' residence. After
the State had presented its case, the court
granted appellees' motion to suppress on the
grounds that the warrant was an illegal "blan-
ket" warrant.13
The district court based its holding that it
had jurisdiction to entertain the motion to sup-
press on rule 46(e) of Hawaii's District
Court Rules of Penal Procedure. 4 On appeal,
however, the Supreme Court of Hawaii
pointed out that the rule in question allowed
motions to suppress to be made only before the
court having jurisdiction to try the offense.
12 55 Haw. 314, 519 P.2d 228 (1974).
13 Id. at - 519 P.2d at 229.
14 This rule states in pertinent part:
MOTION FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY AND TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE. A person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure may move the
court having jurisdiction to try the offense for
the return of the property, or to suppress for
use as evidence anything so obtained.
1975]
COMMENTS
Since the crime that appellees were charged
with was a felony,15 punishable by a maximum
five-year term of imprisonment,' 6 and since, by
state law, district courts in Hawaii did not
have jurisdiction to try felony cases,' 7 the dis-
trict court did not have jurisdiction to try the
offense charged in Wilson. For that reason,
the Supreme Court of Hawaii ruled that the
district court did not have jurisdiction under
rule 46(e) to entertain a motion to suppress.18
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, however, did
not hold that the district court's exclusion of
the evidence was erroneous. Instead, it upheld
the exclusion and dismissal even though they
were based upon "ttechnically inaccurate au-
thority." ' 9 The court reasoned that a state dis-
trict court, in conducting a preliminary hear-
ing, must adhere to the general rules of
evidence, which include objection to the admis-
sibility of unconstitutionally seized evidence.
According to the court, a district court judge
is also bound by his oath of office to uphold
the constitutions of the United States and Ha-
waii. Consequently, the exclusionary rule must
also be upheld, even at the preliminary hear-
ing, as a sanction essential to enforcing the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
20
15HAwAi REv. LAWS § 712-1247(2) (Supp.
1974).
10 HawAir REv. LAWS § 706-660 (1968).
iTHAwAii REv. LAWS § 604-8 (Supp. 1974).
is id. at., 519 P.2d at 230.
19 Id.
20 ld., citing State v. Pokini, 45 Haw. 295, 367
P.2d 499 (1961). In that case, the Supreme Court
of Hawaii, recognizing the special position the ex-
clusionary rule has always occupied in Hawaii,
stated:
It is noteworthy that on the specific question
of admissibility of evidence, debate was had in
the [state] Constitutional Convention on June
5, 1950 . . . on an amendment which would
have added the words: Evidence obtained in
violation of this section (incorporating the
exact language of the Fourth Amendment)
shall not be admissible in any court against
any person. That amendment was substituted
out of fear that this state would . . . follow
states holding against the exclusionary rule of
Weeks.... There was no division among the
delegates in their desire to follow the federal
decisions but only as to how that was to be
accomplished. The problem was resolved by an
instruction that the Committee of the Whole
Report contain the explanation . .. [that the
incorporation of the exact words of the fourth
amendment was intended to give to the state
the benefit of the federal decisions construing
To enable Hawaii's district courts to enforce
the exclusionary rule at preliminary hearings
despite lack of jurisdiction to hear motions to
suppress, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held in
Wilson that a motion to suppress is essentially
the same as a motion to strike when dealing
with the admissibility of evidence. On dubious
authority, 2' the court held that notwithstanding
the label attached to the motion in the Wilson
case, the court would treat it as a motion to
strike and would affirm.
22
the same]; the amendment was withdrawn.
This being the situation, it is evident that the
ruling of the Supreme Court of the United
States on June 19, 1961 (Mapp ...) .....
holding the states to the exclusionary rule of
Weeks, signifies no change in this State, for
we were committed to that course from the
date this State was admitted. Previously, of
course, our Territorial status brought us di-
rectly under the Fourth Amendment. Terri-
tory v. Ho Me, 26 Haw. 331 (1922).
45 Haw. at 308-09, 367 P.2d at 506. There is
some question, in view of the above, whether Po-
kini really supports the majority's position in Wil-
son. Although the language of the proposed
amendment to the state constitution ("shall not be
admissible in any court against any person") fa-
vored allowing exclusion at the preliminary hear-
ing, this amendment was withdrawn. The explana-
tion for withdrawal by the Committee of the
Whole (giving the state "the benefit of Federal
decisions") seems to cut against exclusion at pre-
liminary hearings, since federal decisions do not
require such exclusion.
It should be noted that the Wilson court cited
Rule 5(d) (2) of Hawaii's Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, Laws 1970, Act 188, § 39, as a basis for its
decision that exclusion was proper at the prelimi-
nary hearing. 55 Haw. at_ 519 P2d at 230. How-
ever, this rule provided only that a district court
had the power to conduct a preliminary hearing,
hear evidence, and discharge a defendant should
probable cause not appear from the evidence ad-
duced. The dissent of Justice Ogata demonstrated
effectively that this rule could not provide support
for the court's opinion. Id. at _ 519 P2d at 231.21 Riddle v. State, 257 Ind. 501, 275 N.E.2d 788
(1971), where the Supreme Court of Indiana held
that the defendant had preserved for review the
question of whether probable cause had existed for
a magistrate to issue a warrant to search the de-
fendant's room, by timely objection to the intro-
duction of the disputed evidence at trial. The Wil-
son court cited Riddle for the court's dictum that
"the admissibility of evidence secured under a
search warrant can be challenged either before
trial in a pre-trial motion to suppress, or at trial
by timely objection or motion to strike." Id. at
504, 275 N.E.2d at 790.
.22 55 Haw. at .-, 519 P.2d at 231. Here the
state supreme court was not in conflict with the
state legislature, a phenomenon common in other
states, since the supreme court itself, and not the
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In a footnote to its opinion, the court re-
jected the argument by the state that in future
cases it would be forced to take direct appeal
to the Supreme Court of Hawaii or otherwise
be bound by the decision of the district court
on exclusion (res judicata). The court noted
that since a preliminary hearing in the district
court is only the initial stage of criminal pro-
ceedings, the trial court has jurisdiction after
indictment to consider de novo the issue of ad-
missibility of evidence and is not bound by the
decision of the district court.2 8
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Ogata
struck at the heart of the court's opinion by
criticizing what he believed to be the court's
lack of understanding of the interests properly
protected by the exclusionary rule. It was Oga-
ta's view that the rule, as enunciated in
Weeks, Mapp, and other Supreme Court deci-
sions, applies only to proceedings involving an
adjudication of guilt or innocence.24 Very re-
cently, he noted,25 the Supreme Court had even
stated as much:
Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the ex-
clusionary rule has never been interpreted to
proscribe the use of illegally-seized evidence it
all proceedings or against all persons. As with
any remedial device, the application of the
rule has been restricted to those areas where
its remedial objectives are thought most
efficaciously served.28
Justice Ogata construed the "remedial objec-
tive" of the rule, and the implied interest to be
protected by it, to be the necessity for an effec-
tive deterrent to illegal police action. 7 Justice
Ogata then contended that the exclusionary rule
is not concerned with an attempt to redress the
particular wrong done to the victim of an uncon-
stitutional search.28 It seemed to him that ex-
legislature, promulgated the rule of procedure that
allowed motions to suppress to be made only
before the court having jurisdiction to try the
offense. HAwAII REv. LAWS §§ 5602-21 (1968).
23 55 Haw. at - n.5, 519 P2d at 231 n.5. Ap-
peal was not precluded, however.24 Id. at -, 519 P.2d at 232.
25 Id.
26 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974).
27 55 Haw. at - 519 P.2d at 232. Justice Ogata
cited as authority Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 636-37 (1965).
2855 Haw. at _, 519 P.2d at 232. For further
authority see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
clusion occurs "far too late to be serviceable as
a protective device assuring the privacy of the
particular individual. . . ., 29 Instead, he fo-
cused on the goal of deterring unlawful police
conduct and came to the conclusion that no
valid considerations support the entertaining of
motions to suppress at preliminary hearings
since this procedure could in no way be impor-
tant to deterrence.30
Looking at the relative disadvantages to so-
ciety and the defendant, Justice Ogata felt that
the interest of all citizens in the maximization
of administrative efficiency opposed exclusion
at the preliminary hearing.31 He also con-
tended that from the accused's point of view
such a practice would not be advisable. Citing
Blue, Lawn, and Calandra2 he pointed out that
a prosecutor could obtain an indictment by a
grand jury with excluded evidence because
lower standards prevail for admissibility of ev-
idence before a grand jury. For that reason,
he predicted, prosecutors would seek to avoid
any preliminary hearing to the extent the law
allowed, with the consequence that the accused
at 438: "In sum, the rule is a judicially-created
remedy designed to safeguard fourth amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather
than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved."
:29 55 Haw. at __, 519 P.2d at 232.
30 Id. at _, 519 P.2d at 233. In light of the pro-
vision in Hawaii's rule 46(e), supra note 14, Justice
Ogata formally dissented only on the ground that,
until Hawaiian law could be changed, exclusion at
a preliminary hearing before a court other than
one having jurisdiction to try the case was im-
proper. Justice Ogata's suggestion for change in
the law was adoption of the federal rule. Id. at_
519 P2d at 235. See note 8 supra.
a' 55 Haw. at ___, 519 P.2d at 233. This was one
of the reasons given for the enacting of the federal
statute prohibiting exclusion at the preliminary
hearing. See Committee Note to Rule 5.1, supra
note 8.
a2 55 Haw. at ___, 519 P2d at 233. See Chung v.
Ogata, 53 Haw. 395, 495 P.2d 26 (1972), a case in
which the Supreme Court of Hawaii ruled that the
right to a preliminary hearing may be cut off by
return of an indictment, there being no violation of
the fourteenth amendment in such a procedure.
Justice Ogata was involved in the Chung case when
he was sitting on the circuit court bench. Appar-
ently, he believed then that there was a constitu-
tional violation involved in curtailing the prelimi-
nary hearing, for he forced the state to seek a
writ of prohibition from the supreme court to
prohibit him from preventing the state from seek-
ing an'indictment prior to the holding of a prelimi-
nary hearing in the case.
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would lose important benefits usually derived
from the preliminary hearing.3
3
33 55 Haw. at -, 519 P.2d at 233. Justice Ogata
thought that two serious consequences for the
accused flow from a policy of avoiding preliminary
hearings. First, the accused loses both an oppor-
tunity for some early discovery of the nature of
the case against him and also the occasion to create
and preserve evidence for future use-as impeach-
ment material, for example. Id. at _-- 519 P.2d
at 234, citing Coleman v. Burnett, 155 U.S. App.
D.C. 302, 477 F.2d 1187, 1198-1200 (1973) and
State v. Faafiti, 54 Haw. 637, 641 n.4, 413 P.2d 697,
701 n.4 (1973). See 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 5.1.02 [11 (2d ed. Cipes 1970, Supp. 1971), which
states in pertinent part:
Although the purpose of the preliminary hear-
ing seems to be confined to avoidance of un-
reasonable pretrial detention, its function is
somewhat broader. In practice, the preliminary
hearing may serve as a valuable device to dis-
cover the prosecution's case, particularly in
the absence of other means of pretrial discov-
ery.
Second, the accused loses the opportunity to have
a determination made as to probable cause as soon
as possible. 55 Haw. at _ 519 P.2d at 234.
Some states allow prosecutors to avoid prelimi-
nary hearings under circumstances analogous to
those described in 18 U.S.C. § 3060(e) (1970),
which provides as follows:
No preliminary examination in compliance
with subsection (a) of this section shall be re-
quired to be accorded an arrested person, nor
shall such arrested person be discharged from
custody or from the requirement of bail or
any other condition of release pursuant to
subsection (d), if at any time subsequent to
the initial appearance of such person before a
judge or magistrate and prior to the date
fixed for the preliminary examination pursuant
to subsections (b) and (c) an indictment is
returned or, in appropriate cases, an informa-
tion is filed against such person in a Court of
the United States.
Other states allow omission of the preliminary
hearing only after indictment or upon information.
The fear that prosecutors will avoid preliminary
hearings has had a great influence on federal law.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1 (Advisory Committee
Notes), which states in pertinent part:
A grand jury indictment may properly be
based upon hearsay evidence. . . . This being
so, there is practical advantage in making the
evidentiary requirements for the preliminary
examination as flexible as they are for the
grand jury. Otherwise, there will be increased
pressure upon United States Attorneys to
abandon the preliminary examination in favor
of the grand jury indictment.
For the same reason, subdivision (a) also
provides that the preliminary examination is
not the proper place to raise the issue of ille-
gally obtained evidence....
.. "The Congress has decided that a prelimi-
nary examination shall not be required when
there is a grand jury indictment. Increasing
Justice Ogata also criticized the manner in
which the court chose to implement its decision,
by treating a motion to suppress as a motion to
strike. Justice Ogata contended that conceptual
differences exist between motions to strike and
motions to suppress that should not become
blurred.3 4 The motion to suppress, he said,
urges exclusion because of the manner in
which the evidence was obtained (a collateral
issue), 35 while the motion to strike is used as
an "after-objection" following the inadvertent
admission of evidence that is "inherently ex-
cludable" (because of non-responsiveness of the
answer, incompetence, immateriality, privilege
or hearsay). 3 6
the procedural and evidentiary requirements
applicable to the preliminary examination will
therefore add to the administration pressure to
avoid the preliminary examination.
That federal prosecutors often avoid preliminary
hearings is evident from cases such as United
States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1968);
United States v. Quinn, 357 F. Supp. 1348 (N.D.
Ga. 1973) ; and United States ex rel. Wheeler v.
Flood, 269 F. Supp. 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). In
Note, The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in
Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L.J. 771,
787-8 (1974), the author estimates that only one
of every six cases in federal courts in which a
preliminary hearing could be held actually involves
a preliminary hearing, and that waiver accounts
for only a small fraction of the remaining cases.
For a case in which state prosecutors skipped a
preliminary hearing pursuant to a state practice
allowing such action see Gerstein v. Pugh,
U.S. - 95 S.Ct. 854 (1975).
34 55 Haw. at _, 519 P.2d at 234. Justice Ogata
explained away Riddle, supra note 21, the only case
the majority cited for its interpretation of motions
to strike, claiming that the issue dealt with in the
portion of the case quoted by the majority was not
the issue in Wilson. In Riddle, he correctly noted,
the Indiana court merely stated that unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence should be excluded
either before trial by a motion to suppress or dur-
ing trial by a motion to strike.
,5 55 Haw. at ___ 519 P.2d at 235.
36 Id. See R. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 52 (2d ed.
1972), which states in pertinent part:
Usually, in the taking of testimony of a wit-
ness an objection is apparent as soon as the
question is asked, since the question is likely
to indicate that it calls for inadmissible evi-
dence. But sometimes an objection before an
answer to a question is not feasible. In all
these cases, an 'after-objection' may be stated
as soon as the ground appears. The proper
technique for such an objection is to phrase
a motion to strike out the objectionable evi-
dence, and to request an instruction to thejury to disregard the evidence. Counsel should
use the term 'motion to strike' as just indi-
cated ....
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In other jurisdictions where courts and leg-
islatures have considered whether evidence ob-
tained by unreasonable search and seizure
should be excluded at a preliminary hearing,
discussions have not been as extensive as in
Hawaii. In fact, there are few clear decisions
in other jurisdictions as to whether exclusion
is allowed. Statutes dealing with the subject
are rare and judicial opinion regarding exclu-
sion has primarily been voiced in dicta.
Of the jurisdictions besides Hawaii in which
the decision has apparently been made to allow
exclusion at the preliminary hearing, Califor-
nia and Illinois have laid down the clearest
rules. In California, the entire state evidence
code is applicable to all criminal proceedings
except grand jury deliberations.3 7 Evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing must be
such as would be admissible at a criminal
trial .3 There is also a provision in the Califor-
nia Penal Code specifically providing that the
motion to return property or suppress evidence
may be made at the preliminary hearing in the
municipal or justice court if the property or
evidence to be suppressed relates to a felony
offense initiated by a complaint 9 or a misde-
meanor filed together with a felony.40
While the California rule on exclusion un-
doubtedly has constitutional roots in the fourth
and fourteenth amendments,4 ' case discussions
37 CAL. EVm. CODE § 300 (West 1966) states:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, this
code applies in every action before the Su-
preme Court or a district court of appeal, su-
perior court, municipal court, or justice court,
including proceedings in such actions con-
ducted by a referee, court commissioner, or
similar officer, but does not apply in grandjury proceedings.
38 Hernandez v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App.
2d 20, 299 P.2d 678 (1956) ; People v. Schuber, 71
Cal. App. 2d 773, 163 P.2d 498 (1945).3
0 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (f) (West 1954).
Persons accused of a felony are guaranteed pre-
liminary hearings by CAL. PENAL CODE § 859b.
(West Supp. 1974).
40CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(g) (West 1954).
The same provision declares that if the property
or evidence to be suppressed relates to a misde-
meanor complaint not filed with a felony (one
triable by the municipal or justice court), the mo-
tion to suppress shall be made in the municipal orjustice court before trial and heard prior to trial
at a special hearing considering the validity of the
search or seizure.41 See the concurring opinion of Judge Carter
in Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 820,
330 P.2d 39, 44 (1958).
of the rule tend to emphasize the statutory re-
quirement rather than the constitutional neces-
sity for exclusion. An example of such discus-
sion is from People v. Schuber:
The proof which will authorize a magistrate
in holding an accused person for trial must
consist of legal, competent evidence. No other
type of evidence may be considered by the
magistrate. The rules of evidence require the
"production of legal evidence" and the exclu-
sion of "whatever is not legal" [citations
omitted]. The constitutional guarantee of due
process of law requires adherence to the
adopted and recognized rules of evidence.
There cannot be one rule of evidence for the
trial of cases and another rule of evidence for
preliminary examinations. The rule for the ad-
mission or rejection of evidence is the same
for both proceedings .... The rule which re-
quires less evidence at a preliminary examina-
tion, or even slight evidence, merely goes to
the quantum, sufficiency or weight of evidence
and not to its competency, relevancy or
character.42
The best expression of doubt of the necessity
for exclusion at the preliminary hearing in
California is that of the dissenting judge in
Priestly v. Superior Court.43 He saw the ex-
clusionary rule as the basis for the California
system of exclusion, 44 but he believed the rule
was inapplicable to preliminary hearings. Cit-
ing Costello for the proposition that the rule is
not applicable to grand jury proceedings, he
reasoned that the Supreme Court would not
apply the rule to any pretrial proceeding.45 He
also pointed out that no right to a preliminary
hearing was guaranteed by the federal Con-
stitution.46
The issue of whether a suppression order of
a judge or magistrate at the preliminary hear-
ing should be binding in later criminal pro-
ceedings arose in California, as it did in Ha-
waii. California's penal code provides that the
state may seek a new complaint or an indict-
ment if, after granting a motion to suppress at
the preliminary hearing, a magistrate or judge
should find no probable cause on which to hold
-271 Cal. App. 2d at 775-76, 163 P.2d at 499.
43 50 Cal. 2d 812, 824, 330 P.2d 39, 45 (1958).
44 Id. at 825, 330 P.2d at 46.
45 Id., 330 P.2d at 47.
Id. Gerstein v. Pugh, - U.S. - 95 S.Ct.
854 (1975) was decided much later.
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the accused 7 This "refiling" power, held by
prosecutors everywhere, is a major handicap to
the accused, since he may have no incentive
to ask for exclusion at the preliminary hearing
when the prosecutor can have another complaint
filed. The accused will only have to wait a little
longer for his trial and, perhaps, spend that
time in jail. The California penal code also
provides that the granting of the motion to sup-
press at the original preliminary hearing has no
effect on the admission of evidence at grand
jury proceedings or at proceedings on a new
complaint. 48 If the magistrate or judge at the
preliminary hearing grants the motion to sup-
press, but finds enough other evidence to jus-
tify holding the accused, the State may request
a special hearing de novo in -the superior court
on the admissibility of the evidence suppressed
at the preliminary hearing. The State may
even appeal the decision of the court at the
special hearing to the trial court on the basis
of new evidence of the search and seizure's
validity.49 The accused, on the other hand, may
renew his motion to suppress at a special hear-
ing if it is denied at the preliminary hearing.
But if the motion is denied at the special hear-
ing also, the accused ordinarily can relitigate
the issue only by extraordinary writs of man-
date or prohibition. 0
In Eiseman v. Superior Court,51 a motion to
suppress was granted at the preliminary hear-
ing, but the state failed to request a special
hearing before the Superior Court within the
time permitted, by the penal code. The court
held in Eisenman that, in view of the state's
failure to follow the statutory procedure for re-
litigation, the finding of the court at the pre-
liminary hearing on the motion to suppress
was binding on the trial court.
5 2
47 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(i) (West Supp.
1975).
48 For California law regarding the admissibility
of evidence at the grand jury see note 7 supra.
49 CAr.. PENAL. CODE § 1538.5(f) (West 1954).
"0CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1538.5(h), 1538.5(i)
(West 1954). There is no right to suppress evi-
dence once the trial has begun unless opportunity
for the motion did not exist prior to trial or the
defendant was not aware of the grounds for the
motion.
5121 Cal. App. 3d 342, 98 Cal. Rptr. 342
(1971).
a2 Id. at 348, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 345. For an early
evaluation of exclusion in California under the
statutory provision see Graham & Letwin, The
In Illinois, the decision to allow exclusion of
illegally seized evidence, apparently motivated
at least in part by constitutional considera-
tions,53 has been codified in the Illinois Code
of Criminal Procedure. The proper means of
exclusion in Illinois is the tendering of a mo-
tion to suppress at the preliminary hearing,
held occasionally before the trial judge, but
most often before a magistrate who does not
have jurisdiction to try the case.5 4
Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles: Sone Field
Findings and Legal-policy Observations, 18
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 916, 947 (1971).
53 See Committee Comments (1963) to § 114-12
of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure, which
reads: "In accordance with Mapp v. Ohio, this
section denies the admission of illegally seized
evidence." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-12
(1973) (Comment).
54ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-3(e) (1973)
provides:
During preliminary hearing or examination
the defendant may move for an order of sup-
pression of evidence pursuant to Section
114-11 or 114-12 of this Act or for other
reasons, and may move for dismissal of the
charge pursuant to Section 114-1 of this Act
or for other reasons. If any such order of
suppression of evidence or dismissal of the
charge is allowed and issued in the course of
any preliminary hearing or examination, such
order of suppression or of dismissal shall be
non-final, the State may not appeal therefrom,
and such order of suppression shall not in any
manner bar, affect or be determinative in any
subsequent proceedings.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-12 (1973) provides
in pertinent part:
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY
sEIzED (a) A defendant aggrieved by an un-
lawful search and seizure may move the court
for the return of property and to suppress as
evidence anything so obtained on the ground
that:
(1) The search and seizure without a war-
rant was illegal or
(2) The search and seizure with a warrant
was illegal because the warrant is insufficient
on its face; the evidence seized is not that de-
scribed in the warrant; there was not proba-
ble cause for the issuance of the warrant; or,
the warrant was illegally executed.
(b) except that, if the order suppressing ev-
idence is non-final according to See. 109-3 of
this Act, the property shall not be restored
and shall not because of such order be inad-
missible at any proceeding other than such
preliminary hearing or examination.
It would appear that the specific provision for
motions to suppress at a preliminary hearing in
ILL. REV. Stat. ch. 38, § 109-3(e) (1973) is an
exception to the general statutory rule, provided in
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-12(d) (1973), that
the motion to suppress shall be made only before a
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As in Hawaii and California, the problem
arose in Illinois whether the ruling of the
court at the preliminary hearing ought to be
binding in later proceedings. The state su-
preme court and legislature of Illinois disa-
greed on the proper means to decide this ques-
tion. In enacting the statutory provisions
allowing exclusion at preliminary hearings, the
Illinois legislature reversed state supreme court
decisions providing for appeal from the granting
of pretrial motions, and making corresponding
pretrial orders binding on the trial court in the
absence of an appeal.5 5 In People v. Taylor,56
however, the Illinois supreme court noted that
it had passed a rule providing for appeals from
orders suppressing evidence.57 Finding that the
legislature's provisions had violated a state
constitutional provision conferring rule-making
powers on the supreme court,58 the court held
that to the extent that the statute provided that
the state could not appeal from a preliminary
hearing suppression order, such an order was
non-final and void. Nothing in Illinois law ap-
pears to prevent or provide for an appeal by
the accused from a denial of a motion to sup-
press at the preliminary hearing, however.
court with jurisdiction to try the offense. Were
this not the case, since magistrates have very
limited trial jurisdiction in criminal cases, the
right to suppress at preliminary hearings granted
by Illinois law would be ineffective. See ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 109-1 (1970) (Comment).
55Symposium-Illinois Supreme Court Revieu,
66 Nw. U.L. REV. 874, 876 (1972). The supreme
court cases reversed were People v. Quintera, 36
Ill. 2d 369, 223 N.E.2d 161 (1967) (motion for
discharge, rather than exclusionary motion, made
at preliminary hearing) and People ex rel. Mac-
Millian v. Napoli, 35 Ill. 2d 80, 219 N.E.2d 489
(1966) (motion to suppress filed prior to indictment
but apparently not at the preliminary hearing).
The reversing legislation was Ir.L. REv. STAT. ch.
38, §§ 109-3(e), 114-12(b), supra note 54, which
provided that a decision of a court at a prelimi-
nary hearing in favor of exclusion would not be
appealable by the state and would not bind courts
at subsequent proceedings.
&5 50 Ill. 2d 136, 277 N.E.2d 878 (1972).
57 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110-A, § 604 (1973).68 The Taylor court referred to section 7 of ar-
ticle VI of the 1870 constitution of Illinois as
amended. 50 Ill. 2d at 139, 277 N.E2d at 880. The
particular provision referred to, that the "Supreme
Court may provide by rule for appeals to the Ap-
pellate Court from other than final judgments of
the Circuit Courts," can now be found in ILL.
CoNsT. art. 6, § 6. Other provisions relating to
the supreme court's rule-making power may be
found at §§ 4, 5, 16.
In contrast to Hawaii, California and Illi-
nois, other states' courts and legislatures have
forthrightly announced that however evidence
might have been obtained, it is generally ad-
missible at preliminary hearings.8 9 Kansas, Ar-
izona, and Wisconsin are states whose courts
and legislatures have engaged in particularly
interesting discussions of why they have
adopted such a rule.
In Kansas, the leading case is McIntyre v.
Sands. ° In that case the court explained that in
Kansas the main purpose of a preliminary ex-
amination is to determine whether the corpus
delicti has been established and to give the ac-
cused general information of the nature of the
crime charged and apprise him of the sort of
evidence he will be required to meet when he
is prosecuted in district court. The court held,
therefore, that the same formality or strict
compliance with procedure and the rules of ev-
idence as would be present in a trial is not
necessary at a preliminary examination.
[W]here an attempt has been made to give
an accused a preliminary examination and he
has been given reasonable notice by the papers
and proceedings in the case, of the nature and
character of the offense charged, the examina-
tion has served its principal purpose, and is
ordinarily regarded as sufficient.61
In Arizona, Rule 5.3(b) of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure,62 making inapplicable to
preliminary hearings "rules or objections call-
ing for the exclusion of evidence on the
ground that it was unlawfully obtained," was
promulgated by the state supreme court in
order to reverse the court's earlier ruling in
State v. Jacobson.63 The Jacobson case bears a
59 This is the general common law rule, said to
apply unless modified by constitutional or statu-
tory requirements. 8 J. WIMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2183
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
60 128 Kan. 521, 278 P. 761 (1929).
61 Id. at 522-23, 278 P. at 762. For a somewhat
critical review of Kansas law see Comment, Pre-
liminary Examination-Evdence and Due Process,
15 KAN. L. Rav. 374, 383-86 (1967).
62ARiz. R. Cram. P.5.3(b).
63 106 Ariz. 129, 471 P.2d 1021 (1970). See
ARiz. R. Cmm. P.5.3(b) (1956) (Comment), which
states in part:
Rule 5.3(b) thus limits such issues as sup-
pression motions or objections to the "compe-
tency" of the evidence-to decision by the trial
court. This section reverses the ruling in State
v. Jacobson... and adopts instead the federal
standard. Giordenello v. United States . ...
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striking resemblance to the Wilson case in
Hawaii 6" on its facts and in the opinion of the
court. The defendant was charged with the un-
lawful possession of marijuana. Before his pre-
liminary hearing, he moved to suppress the
seized marijuana on the grounds that it was
obtained in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The state objected to the court's juris-
diction to hear and determine the motion and
obtained a writ of prohibition against the jus-
tice who sat at the preliminary hearing. The
state then sought a writ of special action from
the state supreme court. At issue was whether
the lower court properly found that it had the
jurisdiction to entertain the motion to suppress
and any other constitutional claims that might
be raised.
6 5
In denying the writ of special action in Ja-
cobson, the state supreme court stated that the
lower court did not have the power to grant a
motion to suppress evidence because the supe-
rior court had exclusive jurisdiction of felony
cases under the Arizona constitution. However,
the supreme court ruled that the lower court
did have jurisdiction to rule at the preliminary
hearing on an objection to the admission of
evidence that the search and seizure was un-
lawful and the evidence incompetent.66
Early Wisconsin decisions indicated that ex-
clusion might be approved in that state.
67
18 U.S.C., FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCE-
DuPE 5.1(a) (Supp. 1973).
See also La Sota, Preliminary Proceedings Under
the New Rules of Criminal Procedure, 9 ARIz.
BAR J. 11 (1973). And note that rule 2.4 of
Arizona's Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a
finding of probable cause at the preliminary hear-
ing based on "any testimony before ... the magis-
trate or . any affidavits submitted" (emphasis
added). ARiz. R. Ciru. P.2.4. Thus, Arizona
is one state that allows a probable cause finding to
be based wholly or in part on evidence seized in
an improper manner.
"4See text accompanying notes 12-23 supra.
65 106 Ariz. at 130, 471 P.2d at 1022.
66 Id.
67 Brisk v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 584, 172 N.W.2d
199 (1969) (court relates without comment a dis-
pute at the preliminary hearing concerning the
voluntariness of a confession, but notes that the
failure of the magistrate to exclude it did not af-
fect the defendant's right to contest its admissibil-
ity at trial) ; State ex rel. Wojtycsld v. Hanley,
248 Wis. 108, 20 N.W.2d 719 (1945) (challenged
evidence had not been illegally seized); Hancock
v. Hallman, 229 Wis. 127, 281 N.W. 703
(1938) (magistrate exceeds jurisdiction if he lacks
competent evidence) ; State v. Baltes, 183 Wis. 545,
These decisions prompted the state legislature
to pass a law in 1969 stating that in felony ac-
tions, which are the only ones in which the ac-
cused is entitled to a preliminary hearing in
Wisconsin, motions to suppress can not be
made at a preliminary hearing. 8 The legisla-
tive history of the statute indicates that the
reason for its enactment was to promote ad-
ministrative efficiency by preventing the same
motion from being made both at the prelimi-
nary hearing and prior to trial.6 9 There have
been no Wisconsin cases indicating that any
right to exclude evidence by objection or mo-
tion to strike at the preliminary hearing sur-
vived the legislature's limitation on the motion
to suppress.
While the above mentioned states represent
the extremes with regard to allowing exclusion
at the preliminary hearing-Hawaii, Califor-
nia, and Illinois clearly allowing it and Kan-
sas, Arizona, and Wisconsin just as clearly
disallowing it-the positions of other states
cannot be so easily characterized. Of this latter
group, New York, Michigan, Nevada, and
Idaho are examples of states showing some in-
dications of allowing exclusion.
In New York, the state code of criminal pro-
cedure is generally silent as to whether evidence
other than hearsay that would be inadmissible
at trial is admissible at a preliminary
hearing.70 The only relevant provision requires
that motions to suppress in cases involving an
undetermined felony complaint must be made,
not before the magistrate, but before the supe-
rior court having jurisdiction to try the
offense.7 1 Two cases provide the bulk of perti-
nent judicial discussion of the exclusion prob-
lem.
198 N.W. 282 (1924) (evidence secured by a war-
rant, shown to have been issued without sworn
testimony to support it, will be suppressed).
o8Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 970.02(c), 971.31(5) (b)
(1971).
,69 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.31(5) (b) (1971) (Com-
ment). Recall that the dissenting judge in Wilson
put forward the same argument and that adminis-
trative efficiency was one of the reasons for the
passage of the federal statute prohibiting exclusion
at the preliminary hearing.
70 R. PITLER, NEm YORK CRIMINAL PRACTICE
UNDER THE CPL 208 (1972). Admission of hear-
say evidence is prohibited at the preliminary hear-
ing under CPL § 180.60 (McKinney 1971).
,' N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 710.50(1) (b) (Mc-
Kinney 1971).
[Vol. 66
EXCLUSION AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
In People v. Weiss,7 2 a magistrate, finding
no probable cause to bind over for trial, noted
that under New York law probable cause had
to be based upon the legal evidence before him.
He stated that he could not act upon a suspi-
cion founded on statements of the deceased,
unless they were properly in evidence as dying
declarations. 73 From this holding, it appears
that New York applies the same general rules
of evidence at the preliminary hearing as at
trial.
In People ex rel. Ruppert v. Hoy,74 the
Supreme Court of Westchester County held
that the petitioner in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing was not entitled at his preliminary hearing
to a statutory suppression hearing to determine
the voluntariness of a confession which the
state was attempting to use against him. The
court noted, however, that a magistrate could
not hold the defendant for the grand jury,
which is the result of a probable cause finding
in New York, where the evidence before him
showed the inculpatory statement on which
probable cause had to be based was
involuntary.7 5 Presumably, the court meant by
this that the probable cause finding would not
stand when attacked in a higher court and that
the complaint in such cases should be dis-
missed. Objections to evidence at preliminary
hearings other than motions to suppress, how-
ever, are not ruled out by Ruppert. Nor does
Ruppert or New York statutory law prohibit
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence at the
preliminary hearings granted misdemeanants.
7 6
In Michigan, the state supreme court has
held that the corpus delicti in a criminal case
72 147 Misc. 595, 261 N.Y.S. 646 (Mag. Ct.
1932).
73 147 Misc. at 597, 261 N.Y.S. at 648. Weiss
involved a prosecution for a homicide resulting
from a criminal abortion. The only evidence that
would establish the crime and inculpate the de-
fendants consisted of a written statement signed by
the deceased woman and the testimony of a coro-
ner as to statements made to him by the deceased
prior to her death. Found: no probable cause
because hearsay statements were not admissible as
dying declaration.
74 50 Misc. 2d 326, 270 N.Y.S.2d 647, aff'd 25
App. Div. 2d 884, 270 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1966).
75 50 Misc. 2d at 329, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
76 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 170.75 (McKinney
1971) provides that preliminary hearings shall be
held before the magistrate, in what is also the trial
court, only in the case of misdemeanors charged
within New York City.
must be established at the preliminary hearing
by competent evidence and that the rights of
criminal defendants are fully safeguarded by
objections of their counsel to the admission of
incompetent evidence.7 7 However, the manner
in which a preliminary hearing is conducted in
Michigan is historically very largely within the
sound discretion of the magistrate.78 Appar-
ently, the rationale for the Michigan rule is
that the object of the preliminary hearing in-
quiry would be defeated if the magistrate did
not have the discretion to search into whatever
evidence seems relevant to the finding of prob-
able cause.79 The only significant Michigan de-
cision that places limitations on the discretion
of the magistrate to determine whether evi-
dence is or is not competent at the preliminary
hearing is People v. Hatt. 0 In that case, the
Supreme Court of Michigan laid down the rule
that no evidence of prior convictions is prop-
erly admissible at a preliminary hearing.
In Nevada, Goldsmith v. Sheriffs ' is the
only case providing some basis for exclusion.
Quoting People v. Schuber,8 2 the court in that
case stated that evidence received at a prelimi-
nary hearing must be legal evidence. The case
was a challenge to a bind-over decision based
on hearsay, rather than evidence obtained by
unreasonable search and seizure. Moreover, the
court found that the hearsay which had been
accepted by the court at the preliminary hear-
ing was admissible under a recognized excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. Thus, the court's
statement that only legal evidence can be re-
ceived at the preliminary hearing is dicta.
Finally, in Idaho, the state supreme court
held in Martinez v. State83 that a statement
made by the defendant to a sheriff that he
kicked the deceased child was an "admission,
not a confession" and was admissible at the
preliminary hearing without any proof that it
77 People v. Asta, 337 Mich. 590, 60 N.W.2d
472 (1953).
75People v. Maire, 42 Mich. App. 32, 201
N.W.2d 318 (1972).
79 G. GILLEsPIE, MICHIGAN CRI I AL LAW AND
PRAcrIcE § 303 (1953). Gillespie finds the rule in
effect as early as 1876 and states that all facts and
incidents which "plainly relate to the offense" are
admissible at the preliminary hearing.
8o 384 Mich. 302, 181 N.W.2d 912 (1970).
8' 85 Nev. 295, 454 P.2d 86 (1969).
82 71 Cal. App. 2d 773, 163 P.2d 498 (1945).
8s 90 Idaho 229, 409 P.2d 426 (1965).
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had been voluntarily made. This holding im-
plies that proof of the voluntariness of a con-
fession must be shown at a preliminary hear-
ing in Idaho, but it does not deal directly with
unconstitutionally seized evidence. No other
Idaho case casts any light on the admissibility
of unconstitutionally obtained evidence at a
preliminary hearing.
DISCUSSION
Having surveyed the arguments put forward
by judges and legislators in various jurisdic-
tions as they have considered whether evidence
obtained by unreasonable searches and seizures
should be excluded at preliminary hearings, this
comment evaluates the usefulness of such ex-
clusion in light of the policy considerations
latent in the arguments for and against exclusion.
At least two strong constitutional arguments
can be presented for exclusion at the prelimi-
nary hearing. First, deterrence of unconstitu-
tional police misconduct has always been one
of the main purposes of the exclusionary rule.
Contrary to the opinion of the dissent in State
v. Wilson,84 exclusion at the preliminary hear-
ing can have a deterrent effect. Where evi-
dence seized unconstitutionally is admissible at
preliminary hearings, police could seize evi-
dence illegally, hoping to use it to bind the
accused over for trial. While he is incarcerated
or out on bail, the police could unearth addi-
tional evidence, untainted by illegal police ac-
tivities, which could support a conviction.
Where illegally obtained evidence is inad-
missible at the preliminary hearing, however,
police could not profit by unlawfully obtaining
evidence and might be deterred from such ac-
tivity. It has been argued that the exclusionary
rule has no deterrent effect at trial because a
trial is too remote from police behavior. If this
is true, the police are more likely to be de-
terred at an early stage of the criminal proc-
ess. If, however, considerations such as avoid-
ing the taint of judicial partnership in official
lawlessness and the subsequent undermining of
popular trust in courts are primary, then
tainted evidence must be excluded at all crimi-
nal proceedings.8 5
These rationales for the application of the
8 4 See text accompanying note 30 supra.85 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
355 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Comment,
exclusionary rule in preliminary hearings must
be reconciled with the Supreme Court's failure
to recognize any constitutional necessity for
exclusion at the preliminary hearing.8 6 Perhaps
one reason for the Supreme Court's failure to
require exclusion at the preliminary hearing is
the Court's recognition of only a limited con-
stitutional right to a preliminary hearing. 7 If
states are free under the Constitution to elimi-
nate the preliminary hearing altogether, then it
is arguable that the accused person has no con.
stitutional right to have his preliminary hear-
ing conducted in any particular way. If this is
the rationale for the Supreme Court's stand,
however, it should be reexamined. The same
rationale would support allowing the prelimi-
nary hearing to be conducted along the lines of
a trial by ordeal, to give just one example of
the clearly unacceptable alternatives states
might adopt.
Whatever the reasons for the Supreme
Court's stand, it is not dispositive of the con-
troversy over exclusion that has arisen in the
states. The Court's rulings do not prevent other
courts and legislatures from requiring exclu-
sion at preliminary hearings on federal con-
stitutional grounds. Indeed, so long as no
rights recognized by the Supreme Court are
denied by the states, other courts and legisla-
tive bodies should feel free to extend whatever
rights they wish to accused persons. In doing
so, the state courts and legislatures serve as
laboratories of reform and provoke further ex-
amination by the Court of its past decisions.
Furthermore, state courts and legislatures
can allow exclusion at preliminary hearings on
other than federal constitutional grounds. The
seldom cited ninth amendment to the Constitu-
tion could stand for the proposition that feder-
ally guaranteed constitutional rights need not
be the only ones an accused person possesses.
It states:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.
Preliminary Examination--Evidence and Due
Process, 15 KAN. L. Rxv. 374, 383-86 (1967).86 This problem was mentioned by the dissenting
justice in Wilson. See text accompanying notes
24-26 supra. The dissenting justice in Priestly also
mentioned it. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
87 See note 11 supra.
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In addition, differences in state court procedure
from that in the federal system might support
exclusion. For example, state law might require
preliminary hearingsss or give a magistrate the
authority to make suppression orders.
One of the principal arguments against al-
lowing exclusion mentioned several times in
the cases and the comments to the statutes ex-
amined earlier 9 is that of administrative
efficiency. Resolving constitutional issues at the
preliminary hearing stage increases the amount
of time required for the preliminary hearing
and may be one of the main reasons for in-
creasing calendar congestion in municipal
courts.90 The argument for maximizing admin-
istrative efficiency is most cogent if a court's
decision on a motion to suppress at a prelimi-
nary hearing is not final. If a motion to sup-
press or strike can be heard once at the pre-
liminary hearing, again at trial, and perhaps
even a third time at a grand jury proceeding,
this is an inefficient procedure indeed. How-
ever, the determination at the preliminary
hearing might be made final as long as appeal
is allowed in order to avoid gross unfairness.
Of course, advocates of maximization of ad-
ministrative efficiency could still argue that the
possibility of appeals to state appellate courts
by prosecutors and defendants would neverthe-
less prolong final judgment and further crowd
appellate dockets. The administrative efficiency
argument is a double-edged sword, however.
Where exclusion motions cannot be heard and
determined at the preliminary hearing, expenses
on the part of the State and the accused may
often be increased because prosecutors take
cases to trial in the mistaken belief that the evi-
dence they intend to use will survive the pre-
trial motion to suppress. Even if only a portion
of the state's evidence in a particular case has
been obtained illegally, the prosecutor may be
obliged to drop the case after much needless
88 California is one state that has a statutory
provision requiring preliminary hearings. See note
39 supra.
so See the dissenting opinion in Wilson in the
text accompanying note 31 supra; the comment to
the Wisconsin statute prohibiting motions to sup-
press at the preliminary hearing, supra note 69;
FED. R. CR, . P. 5.1 (Advisory Committee Notes).
90 Graham & Letvin, The Preliminary Hearing
in Los Angeles-Some Field Findings and Legal-
Policy Observations, 18 U.C.L.A.L. Rzv. 916, 944
(1971).
expense if there is no exclusion motion permit-
ted at the preliminary hearing. An early indi-
cation of possible success on the merits and the
admissibility of evidence might therefore in-
crease the efficiency of the state's criminal
process.
A further argument occasionally made in the
cases and comments to the statutes examined
earlier9' is that prosecutors may choose to
forego a preliminary hearing in jurisdictions
allowing motions to suppress, thereby denying
the accused the benefits he derives from that
proceeding. This argument neglects to note
that prosecutors often try to avoid preliminary
hearings whenever possible even in jurisdic-
tions where motions for exclusion of evidence
cannot be made at the preliminary hearing.
This is done because the possibilities for dis-
covery inherent in a preliminary hearing are
thought to be a great advantage for the
accused.92
An argument against allowing exclusion at
the preliminary hearing that is related to the
avoidance of preliminary hearings by prosecu-
tors is the contention that unless motions to
suppress can be made at the preliminary hear-
ing, rather than just motions to strike or
objections to evidence, the prosecutor often
will be able to postpone the determination of
the constitutionality of certain evidence until
trial, even if exclusion is allowed. Unlike the
motion to suppress, the motion to strike or
objection to evidence cannot be used by the de-
fense to exclude from use at trial evidence
which the prosecutor finds unnecessary to in-
troduce at the preliminary hearing.9 3 The util-
ity of the motion to suppress to prevent the fu-
ture use of evidence is limited by the
requirement, generally imposed, that the party
moving for a suppression order show that he
has reason to believe that improper evidence
will in fact be offered eventually against the
defendant. Also, an order of suppression binds
only the opposing party and his counsel. It
does not prevent unsuspecting witnesses from
91See the Wilson dissent in the text accompa-
nying notes 32-33 supra; FED. R. Cuim. P. 5.1
(Advisory Committee Notes).
02 See J. Moore, supra note 33, § 5.1.0211].
93 Graham & Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing
in Los Angeles-Some Field Findings and Legal-




volunteering suppressed information at trial in
response to a perfectly innocuous question.9 4
Nevertheless, the motion to suppress is the
most powerful exclusionary weapon an accused
person can wield at the preliminary hearing,
and it would appear that exclusion cannot be
reasonably effective unless the motion to sup-
press can be made at the preliminary hearing.
Another argument against allowing exclusion
at preliminary hearings is that the accused
might lose his sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial. However, the preliminary hearing might
be considered part of the trial, thus tolling the
time limitation within which a trial must be
brought. Suppression at the preliminary hear-
ing might even be made final, absent appeal, at
all subsequent proceedings against the accused,
thus eliminating the problem of refiling. More-
over, an accused person concerned about his
sixth amendment right has the option of sav-
ing his motion to suppress for the trial court if
he believes that moving for exclusion at the
preliminary hearing will detrimentally delay
his trial.9 5
Another argument against allowing exclu-
sion at the preliminary hearing is that there is
little motive for the defense to launch an all-
out attack on the admissibility of evidence at
the preliminary hearing unless exclusion is
made binding in future proceedings. As men-
tioned in the discussion of administrative
efficiency, however, the determination at the
preliminary hearing of a motion to suppress
can be made final.
A final argument against allowing exclusion
at the preliminary hearing is that neither side
may be prepared to fully litigate the issue at
that early stage in the proceedings. Actually,
however, in states where exclusion is allowed
at the preliminary hearing, that proceeding has
served as a most important forum for the adju-
dication of constitutional issues. It has been es-
timated that constitutional rights are vindicated
more often at the preliminary hearing than at
94Note, Pretrial Exclusionary Evidence Rul-
ings, 1967 Wis. L. Rv. 738, 742-43.
95 Although California law, mentioned in the
text accompanying note 50 supra, provides that
the accused, like the state, may waive his right to
contest the ruling on suppression at the prelimi-
nary hearing by appeal, no state provides that the
accused has waived his right to make a suppres-
sion motion if he does not make it at the prelimi-
nary hearing.
any other point in the criminal process. 90 Ex-
perience indicates, then, that when accused
persons are allowed to press for exclusion at
the preliminary hearing, their attorneys will
prepare to litigate that issue in order to ade-
quately represent them and will force the state
to follow suit.
Opposing all of these arguments against ex-
clusion at the preliminary hearing is the ob-
vious interest of the accused in having an early
determination of the admissibility of evidence
that might be offered against him at trial.
Even if an accused has no federally conferred
or state constitutional right to have such a de-
termination made at a preliminary hearing,
courts and legislatures must recognize that this
interest remains significant. The consequences
to the individual of being bound over for trial
are profound indeed, even if the accused is
never convicted. Incarceration may result, to-
gether with the degradation and expense of a
criminal trial. Irreparable harm to the ac-
cused's reputation may cost the accused his job
and perhaps the affection of his family and
friends. This is an approximation of criminal
punishment that should not be handed down,
perhaps, on the basis of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This comment has surveyed how many
courts and legislative bodies in the United
States have treated the issue of whether evi-
dence seized in violation of constitutional
rights should be excluded at preliminary hear-
ings. In some states, the decision has been
made to allow exclusion on motion of the ac-
cused or proper objection, contrary to present
federal practice and the apparent practice in
many other states. Although the states' deci-
sion-making processes have not been highly
visible in this area, the varying solutions
adopted can be seen as the interaction of exist-
ing state and federal procedures with policy
arguments that have rarely been fully articu-
lated. Neither the arguments for, nor the argu-
ments against exclusion are overwhelmingly
convincing. Many of them rest on behavioralist
96 Graham and Letwin, The Preliminary Hear-
ing in Los Angeles-Some Field Findings and
Legal-Policy Observations, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
916, 944 (1971).
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speculations on the consequences of policy
choices. Although some empirical data might
be procured to support the strong arguments
against exclusion on the grounds of adminis-
trative inefficiency or encouragement of prose-
cutorial avoidance of preliminary hearings, the
value of such data is limited in the face of pro-
cedural variation among the states.
Reviewing the interests supporting and
opposing exclusion at the preliminary hearing
of evidence seized in violation of fourth and
fourteenth amendment rights, one is forced to
conclude -that neither exclusion nor admission
can or should be urged as a uniform national
standard. Perhaps the best approach at present
is for the "laboratories of the states" to de-
velop those solutions to pretrial exclusion
problems that local experience finds most ap-
propriate, since a uniform standard for the
states cannot yet confidently be proposed.
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THE EXCLUSION OF YOUNG ADULTS FROM JURIES:
A THREAT TO JURY IMPARTIALITY
As the number and complexity of criminal
prosecutions continue to grow, the constitu-
tional guarantees extended to criminal defend-
ants assume a significant role in the perpetua-
tion of criminal justice. Yet, the ambiguous
expressions of such rights in the general terms
of the Constitution exist as a source of unlim-
ited confusion. One such right, the sixth
amendment guarantee of a trial by an "impar-
tial jury," 1 invokes a number of questions,
particularly regarding the nature of impartial-
ity and the means necessary to achieve it. The
Supreme Court broadly construes the constitu-
tional requirement to mean "a truly representa-
tive cross-section of the community." 2 How-
ever, the overwhelming amount of litigation
arising from this interpretation demonstrates
the need for a more suitable approach to jury
impartiality. Current pressures within the
American community have engendered con-
stant redefinition of the cross-section without
creating a means for ascertaining the members
of the cross-section.3 One unresolved aspect of
the composition of the cross-section involves
the inclusion of eighteen to twenty-one year
olds in the jury process.
Until 1972 the minimum age qualification
1 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI states in pertinent
part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed.
Until 1968, the sixth amendment only applied to
federal criminal prosecutions. Then in Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) the Court stated:
Because we believe that trial by jury in
criminal cases is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in
all criminal cases which-were they to be
tried in a federal court-would come within
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.
Id. at 149.
2 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
3 The most recent demonstration of this pattern
redefinition in accordance with popular pressure
relates to the inclusion of women within the jury
process. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975).
for jury service was almost universally twen-
ty-one years or older, despite occasional at-
tempts to lower the minimum age restrictions.
However, the ratification of the twenty-sixth
amendment,4 which lowered the voting age to
eighteen for state and national elections, revi-
talized the interest in the inclusion of young
adults in the jury selection process. This inter-
est produced an amendment to the Federal
Jury Selection and Service Act 5 which lowered
the age restriction to eighteen for federal crim-
inal prosecutions. In turn, many states
amended their jury qualification provisions to
include eighteen to twenty-one year olds within
their jury pools. Nevertheless, nearly three
years after this trend began, a number of
states still reject the notion that their mini-
mum age qualifications fail to include an im-
portant segment of the community in the jury
selection process. Even the states whose legis-
latures amended their juror qualification stat-
utes to include eighteen to twenty-one year
olds exhibit a reluctance to include that group
within the actual jury panel. While inclusion
theoretically exists in these states, purposeful
exclusion may still occur through a lax imple-
mentation of the jury selection laws. If a jury
panel must resemble a representative cross-sec-
tion of the community in order to achieve im-
partiality, any divergence from that composi-
4U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI states in pertinent
part:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United
States, who are eighteen years of age or
older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on ac-
count of age.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
,28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (Supp. II, 1972) provides:
In making such determination [of whether a
person is qualified for jury service] the chiefjudge of the district court, or such other dis-
trict court judge as the plan may provide,
shall deem any person qualified to serve on
grand or petit juries in the district unless he
(1) is not a citizen of the United States 18
years old...
28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (Supp. II, 1972), amending
28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (1970).
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tion poses a threat to the rights and interests
secured by the sixth amendment.
This comment will examine the current leg-
islative and judicial attitudes toward the inclu-
sion of young adults in the jury process and
will evaluate the impact of those attitudes on
the criminal defendant's right to an impartial
jury. Consideration of the meaning of repre-
sentative cross-section, in light of its case-by-
case construction, necessarily precedes these
points. A study of the development of the
cross-section requirement will demonstrate the
need to include young adults in order to
achieve jury impartiality.
DEFINING THE CROSS-SECTION
For over 150 years the courts regarded the
sixth amendment guarantee of an impartial
jury as the right to an unbiased jury.6 The re-
alization that no jury selection process could
achieve that ideal standard resulted in the ac-
ceptance of a more practical definition of "im-
partiality." In 1940, the Supreme Court stated
in Sinith v. Texas:
It is part of the established tradition in the
use of juries as instruments of public justice
that the jury be a body truly representative of
the community. For . . . discrimination to re-
sult in the exclusion from jury service of oth-
erwise qualified groups not only violates our
Constitution and the laws enacted under it but
is at war with our basic concepts of a demo-
cratic society and a representative government.
7
Rather than seeking a jury panel untainted by
bias, the new approach attempted to blend the
community biases so as to cancel out their in-
dividual effects." Shortly thereafter the Court
in Glasser v. United States9 employed an ex-
6 See, e.g., Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, Baker v. Hunter, 317
U.S. 681 (1942); People v. Cravens, 375 Ill. 495,
31 N.E.2d 938 (1941) ; Foreman v. State, 203 Ind.
234, 180 N.E. 291 (1932).
7 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
8 See Comment, The Jury: A Reflection of the
Prejudices of the Community, 20 HASTINGS L.J.
1417 (1969). This article discusses the need for
change in jury selection in order to achieve a bal-
ance of prejudices existing within the community.
In addition, it suggests several possible remedies
including federal legislation pertaining to state
jury selection, proportional representation, statisti-
cal population analysis, and elimination of some
bases for exemptions and excusals.
0 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
pression which has since become the standard
against which courts evaluate the constitution-
ality of jury selection processes. Referring to a
federal jury statute, the Court deemed it re-
flective of a plan to make the jury "a cross-
section of the community and truly
representative of it." 10
As the litigation following these early jury
selection cases indicates, much confusion ex-
isted concerning the "cross-section" require-
ment imposed by the Court. In cases then"1
and now,1 2 courts have explained that not
every jury must contain representatives of
every group in the community, for this would
require a jury of far more than twelve per-
sons. The standard merely gives recognition to
"the fact that those eligible for jury service
are to be found in every stratum of society." 13
To achieve impartiality, the process of selec-
tion must function without the "systematic and
intentional exclusion" of any racial, economic
or social group, 14 for such exclusion would re-
sult in injury
not limited to the defendant; there is injury to
the jury system, to the law as an institution,
10 Id. at 86. The Court prefaced this phrase by
stating:
Our notions of what a proper jury is have de-
veloped in harmony with our basic concepts of
a democratic system and representative gov-
ernment.
Id. By imposing its view of the fundamental con-
cerns of government on the case, the Court
apparently equated the need for impartiality of ju-
ries with the demand for representation in all
branches of American government.
"See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187
(1946); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S.
217 (1946).
12 See Taylor v Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)
in which the Court asserted that
in holding that petit juries must be drawn
from a source fairly representative of the
community we impose no requirement that
petit juries actually chosen must mirror the
community and reflect various distinctive
groups in the population.
Id. at 538.
13 Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217,
220 (1946). Cf. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261,
299-300 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting) where it
was stated:
[A] cross-section of the community includes
persons with varying degrees of training and
intelligence and with varying economic and
social positions. Under our Constitution, thejury is ... a democratic institution, represent-
ative of all qualified classes of people.




to the community at large and to the demo-
cratic ideals reflected in the processes of our
courts. 15
While these decisions clarified the initial
problems of interpretation of "a truly repre-
sentative cross-section," they left unsolved the
matters of what constitutes "systematic exclu-
sion" and where the burden of proof falls in
cases involving such flaws in the jury process.
One of the first Supreme Court cases to con-
front these issues, Fay v. New York, 6 in-
volved the constitutionality of a "blue ribbon
jury panel." 17 The Court declared that
a mere showing that a class was not repre-
sented in a particular jury was not enough;
there must be a clear showing that its absence
was caused by discrimination; and in nearly
all cases, it has been shown to persist over
many years.18
Regarding proof of the existence of exclu-
sionary practices, the Court held that the bur-
den fell upon the petitioner.' 9 Here the peti-
tioner failed to establish that the use of the
blue ribbon jury panel had resulted in discrim-
ination. The Court thus rejected the notion
that the absence of any particular group from
the jury panel constituted a violation of the
fourteenth amendment, and deemed the New
York practice of selection of blue ribbon ju-
rors constitutional.
20
I Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195
(1946).
16 Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
17 Blue ribbon jury panels consist of jurors spe-
cifically selected from the general jury panel by
the county clerk. Each prospective blue ribbonjuror receives a subpoena to enter a personal ap-
pearance and testify under oath as to his qualifica-
tions and fitness. The standards prescribed for this
panel are far more restrictive than those applicable
to general jury panels and make ineligible those
who: (1) have been disqualified or exempted from
general service; (2) have been convicted of a
criminal offense or fraud in a civil court; (3)
possess an opinion regarding the death penalty
that would preclude their finding the defendant
guilty where the punishment was death; and (4)
doubt their ability to disregard prejudices, either
personal or created by publicity, in rendering an
opinion of the defendant's guilt. Blue ribbon juries
are part of the "regular trial machinery" in heav-
ily populated jurisdictions of New York, and are
used in those cases where the court upon motion
of either party determines the need for the special
jury. Id. at 267-68.
18 Id. at 284.
19 Id.
20 The Court justified its decision in upholding
the "blue ribbon jury" practice as an act of judi-
In 1954 the Supreme Court again considered
the question of what constitutes systematic ex-
clusion in Hernandez v. Texas.2' The peti-
tioner here, a man of Mexican descent, alleged
purposeful exclusion of persons of such origin
from jury service. 22 While most cases to that




24 the Court conceded that local
prejudices clearly extended to other groups de-
fined as such by community norms. The Court
stated:
When the existence of such a distinct class is
demonstrated, and it is further shown that the
laws, as written or as applied, single out that
class for different treatment not based on
some reasonable classification, the guarantees
of the Constitution have been violated.25
Thus, in Hernandez the court defined system-
atic exclusion as the arbitrary exclusion of a
distinct class of persons by a means unjustifia-
ble under the provisions of the Constitution.
2 6
cial self-restraint in the absence of federal legisla-
tion standardizing judicial administration in the
states. The majority suggested that interference by
the Court in state jury practices would result in
stagnation of the states' experimentation with new
techniques in jury selection. Id. at 295. However,
Justice Murphy rejected this reasoning, stating
that the Court should interfere when a state em-
ploys a practice which systematically excludes cer-
tain classes of persons deemed qualified for generaljury panels. Id. at 297 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
21347 U.S. 475 (1954).
22Petitioner established that within Jackson
County, Texas, approximately 14 per cent of the
13,000 residents had Mexican or Latin American
surnames. The parties stipulated that "for the past
25 years there is no record of any person with a
Mexican or Latin American name having served
on a jury commission, grand jury or petit jury in
Jackson County." Id. at 480-81.
23 See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1934).
24 See, e.g., Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S.
187 (1946) ; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942).
25 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478
(1954).
26 The Court in Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961), expanded this point by stating that where
an alleged systematic exclusion is accomplished
through a statutory exemption, the fundamental
questions to be considered are
whether the exemption itself is based on some
reasonable classification and whether the man-
ner in which it is exercisable rests on some
rational foundation.
Id. at 61. These two cases give rise to the infer-
ence that any exclusion, whether by statutory
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Elaborating on the holding in Fay v. New
York,27 the Court held that the petitioner had
the initial burden of proving that persons of
Mexican descent formed a "separate class"
within the community.28 It suggested that the
petitioner could establish that point by showing
the "attitudes of the community," 29 thereby
implicitly requiring a subjective factual analy-
sis. The next step in the case depended upon
the petitioner's ability to demonstrate the dis-
criminatory nature of the jury selection prac-
tice. To accomplish that task, the Court sug-
gested a comparison of the percentage of
members of the alleged excluded class in the
community population with the percentage of
that class within -the actual jury pool.30 Where
the proportions proved to be unusually dispar-
ate and thus incompatible with the "representa-
tive cross-section" requirement, the burden
would presumably shift to the government to
prove the existence of a reasonable basis for
such practice. Nevertheless, the Court's propos-
als created problems in defining -the identity of
groups within the cross-section.
In Hernandez and later cases, the decisions
of the Court complicated rather than clarified
the issue.3' Moreover, the new decisions did
little more than reiterate the broad solutions
provided in the earlier cases. The vague stand-
ard for determining impartiality of a jury re-
means or actual selection practices, which operates
against an entire class must be shown to possess
some rational basis. Otherwise, the process will vio-
late the constitutional guarantee of jury impar-
tiality.
27 332 U.S. at 284.
28 See note 22 supra.
29 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478
(1954).
30 Id. While the Court in Heriandes offered sta-
tistical comparison as a logical means for exami-
nation of the representative nature of a jury selec-
tion process, it later rejected reliance on
proportional representation alone in achieving the
cross-section standard. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368
U.S. 57 (1961) in which the Court stated that
disproportion . . . on the list independently
carries no constitutional significance. In the
administration of the jury laws proportional
representation is not a constitutionally re-
quired factor.
Id. at 69. See also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202 (1965).
31 The decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968) further complicated matters because
the Court applied the sixth amendment to state
action.
mained unaltered from its 1942 form.3 2 As the
Court recently noted in Taylor v. Louisiana:
The unmistakable import of this Court's
opinions . . . is that the selection of a petit
jury from a 'representative cross-section of
the community' is an essential component of
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.3 s
Furthermore, the Court pointed out that Con-
gress also adhered to this standard in the dec-
laration of policy in the Federal Jury Selection
and Service Act.34 Yet, despite the wide ac-
ceptance of the standard, application of the
cross-section requirement has proved far more
difficult than the simple expression indicates.
The major source of this difficulty inheres in
the resistance of the term to any precise defi-
nition, since every community has a distinct
composition. 5
In the absence of an exact definition, the
threat of spurious challenges to jury selection
processes compelled the Court to impose a pol-
icy that only "systematic and intentional exclu-
sion" will be deemed unconstitutional.3 6 How-
ever, this expression has also defied restrictive
definition and has therefore resulted in consid-
erable controversy.37 For instance, the right of
32 Glasser v. United States 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
3419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
3428 U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. II, 1972) states in
pertinent part:
It is the policy of the United States that
all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial
by jury shall have the right to grand and
petit juries selected at random from a fair
cross-section of the community in the district
or division wherein the court convenes.
32 See Comment, "Jury Mandering": Federal
Jury Selection and the Generation Gap, 59 IowA
L. REv. 401, 403 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Jury Mandering]. This article focused on the pos-
sibility of the existence of a constitutional right of
young adults to participate in federal juries.
38An early use of this phrase in connection
with jury selection appears in Thiel v. Southern
Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). The Court
recognized that complete representation of every
group in the community was an impossibility and
therefore an unreasonable interpretation of the
cross-section requirement. The Court preferred a
construction of the standard for impartial juries as
one by which prospective jurors would be selected
by court officials "without systematic and inten-
tional exclusion" of any identifiable groups.37 See generally Comment, Twelve Good Per-
sons and True: Healy v. Edwards, Taylor v. Lou-
isiana, 8 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 561
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Twelve Good
Persoms]. This comment explores the constitu-




states to impose statutory qualifications for ju-
rors has come under attack where qualifica-
tions such as a minimum age for jurors
allegedly result in unreasonable exclusion of
otherwise qualified jurors.38 There is further-
more the problem of -sufficiency of proof where
the process allegedly constitutes systematic ex-
clusion, in light of the Court's reliance upon a
two-factor test including both objective statisti-
cal and subjective factual analyses.3 9
Finally, the "cross-section" requirement as it
relates to the "systematic exclusion" rule pre-
sents the problem of determining the existence
of an "identifiable group." 40 Prohibitions have
been imposed thus far upon discrimination
against groups identifiable on the basis of sex,
race, color, national origin, religion and eco-
nomic status. 41 However, the inclusion of race
and sex within this list during the past century
makes the exclusiveness of even the present
categories doubtful.
The guarantee of an impartial jury, repre-
sentative of the community attitude, depends
upon recognition of the existence of all groups
competent to evaluate the defendant's rights.
This factor therefore constitutes the basis for
the inclusion of any class within the cross-sec-
tion for jury service.
38 See Note, The Constitutionality of Excluding
Young People from Jury Service, 29 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 131 (1972)[hereinafter cited as Ex-
cluding Youong People]. The author here considers
the exclusion of young citizens from jury service
in light of the ratification of the twenty-sixth
amendment.
39 The Court prescribed the use of both objec-
tive statistical reports and subjective factual mate-
rial in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972). Cf. note 030 supra.
40 Cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) in
which the Court stated that
the exclusion from jury service of a substan-
tial and identifiable class of citizens has a po-
tential impact that is too subtle and too perva-
sive to admit of confinement to particular
issues and particular cases.
ID. at 498. Despite this insight, the Court fails to
explain the nature of class identification.
41 The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1862 (Supp. II, 1972), for example,
specifically prohibits the exclusion of persons from
jury service on those bases. The same list appeared
in Title II, § 201 of the Jury Selection and Service
bill drafted in 1967 to regulate state jury selection
processes. This part of the bill failed to pass. Com-
mittee on the Operation of the Jury System of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Report
on the Federal and State Jury Selection and
Service Bill, 42 F.R.D. 353, 381-86 (1967).
YOUNG ADULTS AS A COGNIZABLE GROUP
Determination of whether eighteen to twen-
ty-one year olds should be considered an essen-
tial element of a fair and impartial jury
depends upon their existence as a cognizable
group within the community. Two factors sup-
port the contention that young adults do con-
stitute a definite and essential part of the
social structure: an objective analysis of the
American population and consideration of
congressional legislation during the early
1970's. In contrast, judicial attitudes with few
exceptions represent the viewpoint that eigh-
teen to twenty-one year olds do not exist as an
identifiable group within the American commu-
nity. Consideration of the validity of each posi-
tion resolves the dichotomy in favor of the ac-
ceptance of young adults as a necessary part of
the impartial jury.
First, an objective examination of the
American population reveals that it includes
twelve million citizens between the ages of
eighteen to twenty-one.42 This figure repre-
sents 5.5 per cent of the total population. Ap-
proximately 79 per cent have graduated from
high school, and of this age group nearly half
of those graduates are enrolled in college.
43
Furthermore, many of the twelve million
young adults participate in the civilian or mili-
tary labor force. They are subject to govern-
mental taxes and to social security payments.
Since 1972 the eighteen to twenty-one year
olds have been eligible to vote in both state
and national elections under the twenty-sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution.
Finally and perhaps most significantly in con-
sidering their competency to serve as jurors,
the young adults of this country are subject to
the criminal laws of state and federal
governments. 44 Regarding the national commu-
nity, then, eighteen to twenty-one year olds
42 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DE-
PARTIMENT OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1973 at 32.
43 Committee on Federal Legislation, Statutory
Reduction of the Voting Age, 25 RECORD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 250 (1970) as submitted to Hearings
on Lowering the Voting Age to 18 Before the
Subcomnn. on Constitutional Amendments of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 622 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings 1970) ].
44 See Excluding Young People, supra note 38,
at 131-32.
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constitute a definite part of social, political and
economic life.
Second, recent congressional legislation rein-
forces this objective analysis by accepting the
role of young adults in the community. In the
areas of voting rights and federal jury service,
Congress reacted to public pressure during the
early 1970's and lowered the minimum age re-
quirements to eighteen. The Senate judiciary
subcommittee hearings on lowering the voting
age45 considered whether young adults in the
social structure have a discernible identity.
According to the report submitted by the Na-
tional Committee on Causes and Prevention of
Violence,4" the youth of today are distinct from
any prior generation of youth in that they pos-
sess greater knowledge and perspective. The
report attributed these characteristics to the
availability of higher education for more young
adults and to the development of mass media and
scientific technology. The testimony of Senators
Birch Bayh of Indiana,47 Edward Kennedy of
Massachusetts, 48  and Joseph Tydings of
Maryland -0 pointed to the parallel expansion of
the adult responsibilities of eighteen to twen-
ty-one year olds. To illustrate this view, the
Senators cited military and civil service, re-
sponsibility under criminal and civil laws, and
tax accountability. Their testimony suggested
that depriving the same group of young adults
of the rights extended to persons over twenty-
one has created an anomalous situation for
eighteen to twenty-one year olds. Society's fail-
ure to accept their maturity in matters of polit-
ical responsibility is incongruous with the rec-
ognition of their ability to defend their country
and of an adult responsibility for their actions
under the law. One commentary 0 submitted to
the Senate subcommittee proposed that this
tension existing between the social and politi-
45 Hearings on Lowering the Voting Age to 18
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amend-
inents of the Senate Coimm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Seate Hearings (1968)]; Senate Hearings
(1970), supra note 43.
46 Senate Hearings (1970), supra note 43, at
315, 316.
-1 Senate Hearings (1968), supra note 45, at 3, 4.
48 Senate Hearings (1970), supra note 43, at 161.
49 Senate Hearings (1968), supra note 45, at 9.
50 Comment, Right to Vote at 18, 6 TRIAL 46,
47 (1970), included in Senate Hearings (1970),
supra note 43, at 427.
cal responsibilities of young adults could be re-
lieved by extending the rights of inheritance,
voting, and jury service to eighteen to twen-
ty-one year olds. In complying with that sug-
gestion by lowering minimum age restrictions
for voting and federal jury service, Congress
implicitly accepted the existence of a qualified,
yet previously excluded, group of young citi-
zens.
Notwithstanding these factors giving recog-
nition to young adults as an identifiable group
within the community, courts with few excep-
tions have rejected the notion of such a group.
Jury impartiality which the Constitution re-
quires demands that the selection processes in-
clude discernible groups of competent citizens.
As the Court stated in Peters v. Kiff:
When any large and identifiable segment of
the community is excluded from jury service,
the effect is to remove from the jury room
qualities of human nature and varieties of
human experience, the range of which is un-
known and perhaps unknowable. It is not nec-
essary to assume that the excluded group will
consistently vote as a class in order to con-
clude as we do, that its exclusion deprives the
jury of a perspective on human events that
may have unsuspected importance in any case
that may be presented.51
Beyond the general statement, however, the
Supreme Court cases fail to enunciate any
standard for the establishment of group ident-
ity. Thus it remains the task of the lower
courts to establish their own criteria. Where
the problem arises with reference to young
adults, the courts have applied tests which are
unsuitable in light of the actual justification
for including eighteen to twenty-one year olds
in the jury panel.
The most restrictive approach yet taken is
that set forth in United States v. Guznan,52 a
federal district court case, and later employed
in other federal and state cases. This test sets
up three factors upon which the determination
of the existence of a cognizable group will de-
pend. First, the court must find that the
"group" has a definite composition which dis-
tinguishes its members. Second, this group
51407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972).
52 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd 468




must be cohesive, possessing a basic similarity
of attitudes, ideas, and experience which ties
the members together and which would not be
adequately represented by a jury from which
this group were excluded.53 Finally, there must
be a possibility that exclusion would result in a
bias against the interests of the group. Under
this test, the claim that eighteen to twenty-one
year olds constitute a cognizable group has
generally failed.54 In Guzman, for instance, the
court held that no factor other than age de-
fined the group. Furthermore, since its mem-
bership was in a constant flux, the court
found it impossible to discern any definite
composition. As a consequence, the district
court found that no identifiable class existed.
55
Other courts, however, have rejected the po-
sition taken in Guzman. In United States v.
Butera,56 the First Circuit admitted the diffi-
culty of defining a precise group. Furthermore,
it insisted that too much precision
would introduce unnecessary and unrealistic
inflexibility and might effectively preclude
anyone from ever showing a distinct class [in
terms of age].57
In Butera, the court implicitly rejected a test
5 At least this part of the Guznza test has
been adopted elsewhere. See, e.g., Adams v. Supe-
rior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 55, -, 524 P.2d 375, 379,
115 Cal. Rptr. 247, 250 (Sup.Ct. 1974) in which
the court held:
While exclusion of other groups [beyond ra-
cial, sexual, political, economic, social, reli-
gious and geographical groups] might also be
improper, it is apparent that, before exclusion
may be held improper, there must be a corm-
1mo thread runming through the excluded
group-a basic similarity of attitudes, ideas or
experience among its members so that the ex-
clusion prevents juries from reflecting a
cross-section of the community. (Emphasis
added).
Whether the court accepted the other facets of the
Guzman test is unclear from the opinion. See also
People v. Veralli, 64 Misc. 2d 321, 314 N.Y.S.2d
723 (1970).
,54 See United States v. Olson, 473 F.2d 686
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973);
United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973); cf.
Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 141 (7th Cir.
1972). In the last of these cases, Chase, the court
observed that the enumeration of prohibited bases
of discrimination failed to include any reference to
age groups in 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1972). Id. at 146.
5 United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140,
145 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
56 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970).
57 Id. at 571.
as stringent as that employed later in Guzman.
Instead of the three-fold test, this court con-
cluded that common experience alone sufficed
to establish variations in attitudes based on age
differences and thus provided a basis upon
which the court could conclude that
young adults constitute a cognizable though
admittedly ill-defined group for the purposes
of the defendant's prima facie case.58
To deny such group's existence would be to ig-
nore
the contemporary national preoccupation with
a 'generation gap' which creates the impres-
sion that the attitudes of young adults are in
some sense distinct from older adults.59
Although this case arose during a time when
discussion of a generation gap was prominent
in national news, the bases for such a gap still
pervade American society. Young adults con-
tinue to occupy an unique economic, social and
philosophical position in society. Thus the
treatment in Butera of youth as an identifiable
group finds justification today just as it did in
1968. Moreover, the fact that the group recog-
nized in Butera ranged in age from twenty-one
to twenty-nine does not lessen the significance
of the case.60 While clearly in the minority,
Butera represents a judicial awareness of the
distinctive characteristics of young adults.
Since the court decided Butera, other state and
federal courts who are unwilling to preclude
young adults from jury service solely on the
basis of a narrow definition of group identity,
have recognized the existence of a group of
58 Id. at 570.
59 Id. The court's view that young adults pos-
sess attitudes different from those of their elders
finds support in sociological studies of youth. See,
e.g., K. KENISTON, YOUNG RADICALS (1968);
K. kENISTO, THE UNCOMMITTED (1965).
60 The breadth between the upper and lower age
limits of the "young adult" group provided a basis
of distinction between this case and a later one. See
United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 145
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). Furthermore, the group in But-
era failed to encompass eighteen to twenty year
olds. This factor arguably makes the application of
Butera to the group of eighteen to twenty-one
year olds even more tenuous. However, Butera
arose prior to the period when the campaign for
the rights of young adults gained momentum. One
may speculate that, had the court decided Butera
in the 1970's, the First Circuit would have in-
cluded eighteen to twenty year olds in the cate-
gory.
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young adults in order to reach the issue of dis-
crimination. 6'
As present case laws reflects, the reluctance of
most courts to admit the presence of a cognizable
class of eighteen to twenty-one year Olds within
the American community stems from an unsa-
tisfactory, rigid definition of a group. 62 Yet the
approach taken in determining the existence of
a group of young adults is far more restrictive
than any test applied where other alleged
groups have been considered for jury service
purposes. For example, a series of cases culmi-
nating in Taylor v. Louisiana 3 gave recogni-
tion to the existence of women as a group for
jury purposes without demanding that the peti-
tioner demonstrate cohesion within that group.
Rejecting the view that an all-male jury would
be as representative as one including women,
the Court in Taylor admitted that neither sex
acted as a class when participating in jury du-
ties. However, the inclusion of both sexes is
essential due to the "subtle interplay of influ-
ence one on the other." 64 Itcan be argued
likewise that while young adults as jurors do
not necessarily act as a group, their presence
may have a definite influence on the jury de-
61 On the federal level see Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) in which the Court was
willing to assume that such a group existed in
order to reach the narrower issue of discrmination.
See also White v. Georgia, 414 U.S. 886 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
On the state level see State v. Holmstrom, 43
Wis. 2d 465, 168 N.W.2d 574 (1969) where the
court held:
We find no authority with reference to the
systematic exclusion of young persons as pro-
hibited discrimination. Nevertheless, we think
systematic discrimination in regard to age
would render the jury array jirst as defective
as any other type of systematic discrinination.
Within these guidelines then, it is necessary to
review the proof this defendant introduced in
his challenge to this array.
Id. at 473, 168 N.W.2d at 578 (emphasis added).
Even where the courts as in Hohnstrom have
been willing to recognize or assume a cognizable
group of young adults, they have found no in-
stances of systematic exclusion. Thus the restric-
tive interpretation of an identifiable group is not, in
itself, the determinative factor in the exclusion of
young adults from juries.
62 See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
63419 U.S. 522 (1975). Earlier cases concern-
ing the inclusion of women on juries are: Hoyt v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 51 (1961); Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
04Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
termination. Like all jurors, they react to cases
on the basis of values engendered by their per-
sonal experiences; yet, by virtue of the techno-
logical, educational and other forms of
modernization within the past twenty-five
years, experiences brought into the court by
young jurors may differ greatly from those of
older jurors. Thus, in light of the "subtle in-
terplay" of different human attitudes, the ex-
clusion of this segment of the community re-
sults in a jury improperly excluding a distinct
element of the community.
ExCLUSION FROM THE CROSS-SECTION
Assuming that a cognizable group of young
adults does exist with the American community,
the next issue is whether such group has been
wrongfully excluded from the "representative
cross-section of the community," the jury panel.
Claims of exclusion of eighteen to twenty-one
years olds have arisen in two distinct situa-
tions. First, the absence of young adults from
the jury selection process may stem from the
statutory imposition of minimum age qualifica-
tions. Second, the alleged exclusion may result
from a latent discriminatory application of jury
selection procedures. Although the end prod-
ucts of both processes are identical, the analysis
of their development and possible effects and
remedies requires separate treatment.
Until 1972 nearly all complaints of wrongful
exclusion of eighteen to twenty-one year olds
fell in the first category.65 Eligibility for jury
service in federal and most state courts in part
depends upon minimum age qualifications.
Prior to 1968, the federal jury qualification de-
pended upon the laws of the state in which the
federal court sat. The Federal Jury Selection
and Service Act of 1968 required jurors to be
at least twenty-one for federal juries. 66 The
states, allowed to establish their own juror
qualifications, generally conformed to the fed-
eral minimum age restriction. In August 1970,
the National Conference of Commissioners of
'5 United States v. Tantash, 409 F.2d 227 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 968 (1969) ; George v.
United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 843 (1952); United States v. Guzman,
337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (trial jury
selected prior to enactment of the amendment to
the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1865 (1972)).6628 U.S.C. § 1865 (Supp. II, 1972).
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Uniform State Laws approved a Uniform Jury
Selection and Service Act 67 resembling the
federal legislation and submitted it to the states
for their consideration. This act also set the
proposed age qualification at twenty-one.6"
This nearly universal acceptance of twenty-
one as the minimum age for qualified jurors
was founded upon two factors. To begin with,
the age of twenty-one had long represented the
age of maturity in Anglo-American society6
and thus became the age at which citizens
were competent to serve as jurors.70 In George
v. United States, the Ninth Circuit stated:
[M]inority as a disqualification for participa-
tion in certain types of employment and the
performance of certain public or social func-
tions is recognized in the law of U.S.1
Rejecting the argument that the statute wrong-
fully excluded minors from jury service, the
court held that
as to adults, minors would represent not a
part of the cross-section of the community, but
a wholly foreign group unrelated to the adult
stream which dominates American life.
72
67 See Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act,
8 HARv. J. LEis. 280 (1971). The Commissioners
suggested that while the states have a right to
prescribe restrictions upon juror eligibility, they
are bound to observe the uniform standard im-
posed by the fourteenth amendment due process
clause. The Conference offered this model act as a
means of achieving consistency in the states' inter-
pretations of due process as it relates to state jury
selection. However, only a handful of states, in-
cluding Maryland, Maine, Michigan and North
Carolina, have enacted the model provision.
68 Id. at 300.
69 See James, The Age of Majority, 4 AM. J.
LEGAL HisT. 22 (1960) in which the author traces
the history of the designation of twenty-one as the
age of majority. He concludes that age was adopted
as such during the mid-thirteenth century when the
age for knighthood was raised from fifteen to
twenty-one. Mr. James attributed this change in
the minimum age for knighthood, not to any recog-
nition of increased maturity or competency, but to
the increased weight of armor and need for extra
training in combat skills and chivalry. This age
was then carried over into the common law.
70 Deputy U.S. Attorney General Richard
Kleindienst observed during his testimony before
the Senate subcommittee hearing that in England,
where twenty-one was first recognized as the age
of maturity, Parliament lowered "the age of full
legal capacity" to eighteen, effective January 1,
1970. Moreover, this act also set the minimum age
for jury service in England. Senate Hearing (1970),
supra note 43, at 78.
71 George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445, 452
(9th Cir. 1952).
72 Id. at 454. This case arose out of an alleged
The Ninth Circuit decided this case in 1952;
courts in more recent cases have dealt with the
minimum age requirement of twenty-one
merely as a matter of legislative discretion.
This change in position perhaps stems from
the parallel change in attitudes towards twen-
ty-one as the age of maturity. Eighteen to
twenty-one year olds no longer represent a
"wholly foreign" entity, but have come to be
viewed as a part of adult society with attend-
ant responsibilities and obligations.
In addition, the present view arises from the
judicial acceptance of the legislatures' right to
impose certain criteria for jury selection pur-
poses. With regard to state jury selection, for
example, the Supreme Court held in Carter v.
Jury Commissioner:
The states remain free to confine the [jury]
selection to citizens, to persons meeting speci-
fied qualifications of age and educational at-
tainment and to those possessing good intelli-
gence, sound judgment and fair character.7 3
On the federal level, the Fifth Circuit asserted
in United States v. McVern that
it has never been thought that federal juries
must be drawn from a cross-section of the
total population without the imposition of any
qualification.7 4
The courts repeatedly upheld the statutory dis-
qualification of eighteen to twenty-one year
olds as within the legislative prerogative.
violation of the Selective Service Act of 1948, 50
U.S.C.A. appendix §§ 453, 456(j), 462 (1948), by
a person under twenty-one years old.
73 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970). This case is the
first affirmative relief case in the area of jury
selection. The petitioner was not a criminal de-
fendant seeking to challenge the composition of the
jury which convicted him. Instead the case was
brought as a class action by Negroes in the
Greene County vicinity who charged local jury of-
ficials with discriminatory exclusion. Justice Jack-
son suggested such an action as a means of attack-
ing state jury selection in Cassell v. Texas, 339
U.S. 282, 298 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
74 436 F.2d 1120, 1122 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 822 (1971). This case was an appeal
from a conviction of unlawful possession and sale
of a hallucinogenic drug STP. The petitioner was
under twenty-one years of age, whereas the jury
which convicted him was drawn from a pool ex-
cluding persons under twenty-one. The Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the statutory exclusion of persons
under twenty-one years old did not deprive peti-
tioner of his rights under the fifth and sixth
amendments.
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A second ground for excluding that age
group from jury service lay in the parallel dis-
qualification of eighteen to twenty-one year
olds for other purposes such as voting in na-
tional and state elections. However, the mini-
mum age qualification for voting historically
derived from the concept that twenty-one was
the age of majority. As the ratification of the
twenty-sixth amendment indicates, there was
no longer any viable foundation for the twenty-
one year old age of majority by 1972. The
Senate hearings which considered proposals
for that amendment illustrate this point. Sena-
tor Bayh, for instance, suggested that it would
be
in keeping with the tradition of expansion of
the franchise, as well as recognition of the
greater role played by American youth in our
lives today, that we should now allow the
Constitution to reflect what has already be-
come a fact of life in our land: that our
young people today are well-bred, well-edu-
cated and extremely well aware of the posi-
tion and needs of our Nation, and that they
should now be permitted to participate in the
building of our Nation through the most valu-
able American right, the right to vote.75
Similarly, Senator Tydings stated that any re-
gard for the age of twenty-one as the tradi-
tional age of maturity should not remain
"sacred or immutable."
Whatever justification existed for imposing 21
as the minimum age a century ago, however,
the fact is that today's American young people
are achieving physical, emotional, and mental
maturity at an earlier age than ever before.
While the traditional 21 year old voting age
has remained unchanged, the character of our
population has changed drastically, especially
with regard to the education, maturity and re-
sponsibilities assumed by our young people.76
In 1972 Congress and the ratifying states finally
recognized as anachronistic the practice of
restricting voting rights to citizens at least
twenty-one years old. They thus lowered the
minimum age to eighteen for state and national
elections.7 7
Loss of the voting age justification for the
minimum age requirement for jury service re-
77 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. See note 4 supra.
7o Id. at 9.
77 U.S. CoNsT. amend XXVI. See note 4 supra.
suited in immediate attacks upon the jury
selection processes of state and federal juris-
dictions. In Guzman, the petitioners alleged that
the right to serve on juries was analogous to
the right to vote, and that, as fundamental
rights, neither could be denied without a
compelling governmental interest.78 Therefore,
statutory exclusion of eighteen to twenty-one
year olds under the Federal Jury Selection and
Service Act violated the Constitution.
The court disagreed, finding no justification
for equating the two. 9 The court argued that
while voting enables the voter to express his
personal beliefs and interests, jury service ne-
cessitates the juror's acceptance and applica-
tion of the law as the judge instructs. The
court then stated that the latter act demands a
greater maturity and understanding than vot-
ing. Furthermore, while voting is a fundamen-
tal right, the court held that sitting in judg-
ment of another is not a right, but a duty
imposed on those selected. However, the right
more properly at issue in jury selection cases
is the right of the defendant to an impartial
jury, in which case the statutory exclusion of
young adults does jeopardize a fundamental
right of the criminal defendant. Congress pre-
sumably considered this factor in 1972 when it
amended the Federal Jury Selection and Serv-
ice Act to include eighteen to twenty-one year
olds within the federal jury process.8 0
On the state level the twenty-sixth amend-
ment has had varying effects upon jury selec-
tion processes.81 In those states where juror
7SUnited States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140,
144 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
79 Id.
80 See note 5 supra.
81 The most recent jury qualification statutes
and the minimum age requirements for the states
are: ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 21 (Supp. 1969) (not
under twenty-one); ALASKA STAT. § 09.20.010
(Supp. 1971) (at least nineteen); ARiz. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 21-301(a) (Supp. 1970) (registered
voter); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 39-101 (Supp.
1969) (registered voter); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §
198 (West 1974) (eighteen); CoLo. Rav. STAT.
ANN. § 78-1-1 (1963)(twenty-one); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 51-217 (Supp. 1973) (an elector);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4504(a) (Supp.
1970) (qualified voter); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
40.01(1) (Supp. 1973) (eighteen); GA. CODE ANN.§ 59-106 (Supp. 1973) (registered voter); HAWAII
REv. LAws § 612-4(1) (Supp. 1974) (eighteen);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2-209(2) (1974) (eighteen);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 78, § 2 (1973) (eighteen) ; IND.
ANN. STAT. § 33-4-5-7(1973) (registered voter);
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qualifications coincided with those for regis-
tered voters, eighteen to twenty-one year olds
were by law automatically included within the
jury panel.8 2 For other states, the constitu-
tional amendment acted as a catalyst for legis-
lative action.8 3 Some states initially rejected
the constitutional amendment as a basis for
IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.1 (1949) (qualified elector);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 43-156 (1971) (qualifications
of an elector); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29.025
(Supp. 1971) (at least eighteen) ; LA. CODE CRIM.
PRO. ANN. art. 401 (2) (West 1967) (at least twenty-
one); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1254 (Supp.
1973) (registered voter) ; MD. CODE ANN. art. 51, §
6(viii) (Supp. 1973) (eighteen); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 234, § 1 (Supp. 1973) (any qualified
voter) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A, 1306(a) (Supp.
1971) (an elector); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 593.04,
628.54 (1973) (eighteen) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-
5-1 (1972) (twenty-one); Mo. AxN. STAT. §
494.010 (Supp. 1973) (over twenty-one); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 93-1301 (Supp. 1973) (eighteen) ;
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601 (1969) (over twenty-
one); NEv. REv. STAT. § 6.010 (1973) (qualified
elector) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 500.1 (Repl.
Vol. 1968) (selectman's list) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:69-1 (Supp. 1973) (twenty-one); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 19-1-1 (1953) (qualified elector); N.Y.
JUDICIARY LAWS § 662(2) (McKinney 1974) (eigh-
teen) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-3 (1974) (eighteen);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-105(1) (Repl. Vol.
1973) (eighteen) ; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.06
(Baldwin 1973) (elector); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
38, § 28 (Supp. 1973) (elector) ; ORE. REv. STAT. §
10.030(c) (Repl. Vol. 1973) (over eighteen); PA.
STAT. tit. 17, § 942 (1962) (qualified elector); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-9-9 (1972)(over twenty-
one); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-52 (Supp.
1973) (twenty-one) ; S.D. CODE §§ 16-13.10
(1973) (eighteen); TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-101
(1973) (eighteen); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
2133 (Supp. 1973) (eighteen) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-46-8(1) (1953) (over twenty-one) ; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, app. vii, pt. 1, R.25 (1973) (eighteen) ;
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-208-2 (Repl. Vol. 1974) (over
eighteen); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.36.070(1)
(Supp. 1973) (elector) ; W.VA. CODE ANN. § 52-1-1
(Supp. 1974) (eighteen); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
255.01(2) (1971) (qualified elector) ; Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-77(1) (Supp. 1973) (an adult citizen).
82 Some states altered their requirements to co-
incide with those for voting qualification, thus ob-
viating the need for a specific age provision.
83 See Kaufman, Harbingers of Atry Reform, 58
A.B.A.J. 695, 697 (1972) in which Judge Kaufman
of the first circuit stated that
it is likely that the consideration that moved
state legislatures rapidly to adopt the lower
voting age amendment most likely will move
them to lower the age for jury duty as well.
The trend toward lower age for state jury eli-
gibility is already apparent.
He noted, furthermore, that some states' attorneys
general had ruled that eighteen year olds would be
automatically eligible, even in the absence of spe-
cific statutory provision.
amending their jury procedures to include
eighteen to twenty-one year olds, distinguish-
ing voting and jury qualifications.8 4 Neverthe-
less, even this resistance to change has sub-
sided, so that now only eleven states have
statutes precluding eighteen year olds from
jury service.85
These states may eventually follow the ex-
ample set by other states and relax their jury
qualifications. Until they take this step, how-
ever, the jury panels within these states argu-
ably violate the cross-section requirement for
impartial juries. Undeniably, the same condi-
tions which led other jurisdictions to recognize
the need for young adult jurors exist in these
states: voting age, criminal responsibility, eli-
gibility for military and civil service among
others. Moreover, acceptance by some states of
the ability of eighteen to twenty-one year olds
to act as responsible jurors and denial of the
same fact in other states constitutes an unjusti-
fiable inconsistency. The states frequently cite
Carter v. Jury Commissioners6 as determina-
tive of the states' right to prescribe relevant
qualifications for potential jurors and thus to
resist pressures directed at changing the mini-
84 See People v. Scott, 17 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 309
N.E.2d 257 (1974) ; State v. Silva, 259 So. 2d 153
(Fla. 1972). In the former case, the Illinois
Appellate Court held that the twenty-sixth amend-
ment did not implicitly repeal the minimum age
requirement of twenty-one for jury service, nor
was it inconsistent or irreconcilable with the
higher minimum age.
85 Those states are Alabama, Alaska, Colorado,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Utah.
See note 81 supra.
86396 U.S. 320 (1970). The Court stated:
Whether jury service be deemed a right, a
privilege, or a duty, the State may no more
extend it to some of its citizens and deny it to
others on racial grounds than it may invidi-
ously discriminate in the offering and with-
holding of the elective franchise . . . . That
kind of discrimination contravenes the very
idea of a jfury-'a body truly representative of
the community,' composed of the peers or
equals of the person whose rights it is selected
or summoned to determine; that is, of his
neighbors, fellow associates, persons hawing
the same legal status in society as that which
he holds. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 308 (1879). (Emphasis added).
Id. at 330. Arguably, the cross-section should in-
clude young adults because they have the same
legal status as perons over twenty-one. Their ex-
clusion from jury service contravenes the principle
of trial by one's peers for those criminal defend-
ants under twenty-one.
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mum age. In the Carter decision, however, the
Court held that the states' discretion must be
restricted where it jeopardizes the cross-section
requirement.
Another case, San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 7 provides an ap-
propriate test of propriety for state laws. The
Court held that a standard of "strict judicial
scrutiny" applies wherever the laws of a state
operate to the disadvantage of a suspect class
of individuals or interfere with the exercise of
fundamental rights, either explicitly or implic-
itly guaranteed by the Constitution.88 In the
present situation, the courts should follow the
same judicial standard to determine the consti-
tutionality of laws excluding eighteen to twenty-
one year olds from jury service in light of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The fundamental right at stake,
that of the criminal defendant to have an im-
partial jury, demands this precaution.
Such careful scrutiny should also extend into
those jurisdictions where the exclusion of
young adults occurs because of a latent dis-
criminatory application of jury selection proce-
dures. In such cases, the legislatures have re-
formed the minimum age qualifications for
jury service, but the jury selection processes
in practice continue to exclude eighteen to
twenty-one year olds. Implementation of the
amended laws necessitates a revamping of the
lists from which the panels are drawn and per-
haps a resort to additional lists if the original
fails to include the new group of eligible ju-
rors. The tediousness and time-consuming as-
pects of this adjustment often result in a gen-
eral reluctance to begin the process until a
change in law requires new juror lists.
Courts such as the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. DiTommaso 9 have actually supported
such activity by jury selection officials. In that
case, for instance, the criminal defendant dem-
onstrated a disparity in the number of young
adults on the jury panel as compared to the
number of such young adults in the commu-
nity. The court took judicial notice of
the likelihood that young adults, having
greater mobility than the average of the popu-
87 411 U.S. 1 (1973).8 8 Id. at 3.
89 405 F.2d 385 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 934 (1968).
lation, persons in military service, and young
women with small children and the responsi-
bility of caring for them, would be more
likely than older adults having a relatively
fixed abode, not in military service and having
grown families,90
to be unresponsive to jury questionnaires. The
court thus dismissed the possibility of a flaw in
the system itself.
In other cases, the courts also have refused
to recognize actions as resulting in impermissi-
ble exclusion.91 In order to show a violation of
the sixth or fourteenth amendment, the claim-
ant must show that exclusion from the cross-
section was systematic and intentional. Ham-
ling v. United States, a recent Supreme Court
case, upheld the Ninth Circuit finding that
petitioners had failed to
establish a purposeful systematic exclusion of
the members of that class [eighteen to twenty-
one year olds] whose names, but for such
systematic exclusion would otherwise be se-
lected for the master jury wheel.92
In this case, the master jury wheel from which
federal jury panels were selected had not been
refilled for nearly four years. Because eligibil-
ity at the last refilling had been restricted to
citizens twenty-one and over, the youngest
juror in the master jury wheel at the time of
petitioner's trial in 1972 was twenty-four. The
Court deemed this exclusion of eighteen to
twenty-four year olds an unavoidable conse-
quence of judicial administration, rather than a
systematic exclusion.93 Yet it left unanswered
the fundamental question of whether a court
may correctly subordinate the right of the
criminal defendant to an impartial jury to
such an exaggerated form of administrative
convenience. 94
90 Id. at 389.91 See generally Twelve Good Persons, supra
note 37, at 573, 584-87.92 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 137
(1975).
93 Id. at 138. The court stated:
Congress could reasonably adopt procedures
which, while designed to assure that 'an im-
partial jury is drawn from a cross-section of
the community,' Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,
328 U.S. 217, 220, at the same time take into
account practical problems in judicial adminis-
tration.
Id.
94 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535
(1975), in which the Court criticized the state's
1975S1
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United States v. Gunmian demonstrates an-
other technique by which the courts have
avoided the issue of exclusion of young adults
from jury panels. In that case, the court stated
that where a particular group is under-repre-
sented in the source of the jury panel names,
the court will infer intentional or systematic
exclusion. 95 The test of under-representation,
as set forth in United States v. Butera, consists
of comparing the percentage of representation
of the group in the source list with the per-
centage of the group in the total population.
Where the percentage in the latter category
exceeds that of the former, the Butera court
suggested that such disparity constitutes an
inference of discrimination necessitating cor-
rection.9G The court in Guizman stated that the
failure of the Butera court to establish pre-
cise limits for permissible disparities in per-
centage made such a test impracticable. Thus
the Guzman court refused to infer from the
facts of the case that the jury selection process
constituted prohibited discrimination against
any group.9
7
As the minority opinion states in White v.
Georgia, statistical disproportions in jury panel
analyses deserve more weight than they have
received thus far.98 The petitioners in that case
claimed that the state jury selection process
discriminated against young adults in violation
of their fourteenth amendment rights. The
Court dismissed the case for lack of a substan-
tive federal question,99 thus avoiding the issue
of whether statistically disproportionate under-
use of "administrative convenience" as a justifica-
tion for exempting women as a class from jury
service. The fact that jury duty would constitute
a special hardship for some women was an in-
sufficient reason for diluting the quality of commu-
nity judgment represented by the jury in criminal
trials. This same point applies to the exclusion of
eighteen to twenty-one year olds which courts at-
tribute to the hardship jury service causes for that
segment of the community. See State v. Holm-
strom, 43 Wis. 2d 465, 472, 168 N.W.2d 574, 577
(1969).
95 United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140,
143 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).96 United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 570
(1st Cir. 1970).
97 United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140,
143 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
98414 U.S. 886, 888 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
99 Id. at 886.
representation of cognizable groups in the
state jury pool would constitute a prima facie
case of discrimination. In their dissenting
opinion, however, Justices Brennan, Douglas,
and Marshall found clear evidence of under-
representation of eighteen to thirty year olds
in the statistics offered by petitioners. Al-
though 26.2 per cent of the community were
eligible young adults in this age category, only
3.0 per cent of the petit jury pool and 1.25 per
cent of the grand jury pool were within that
age group. The under-representation amounted
to 95.2 per cent in the grand and 88.2 per cent
in the petit jury pools. While noting that there
is no constitutional right to mathematically
proportional representation on jury panels, the
minority stated that the selection procedure
must provide "a fair possibility for obtaining a
representative cross-section." 100 The dissenters
questioned whether the principle of Alexander
v. Louisiana'"' should apply whenever any
large identifiable segment of the community is
arbitrarily or discriminately under-represented
on a jury panel.
Alexander v. Louisiana concerned an allega-
tion that the grand jury indictment was invalid
because it was returned by a grand jury se-
lected from an unrepresentative panel. The
selection process required potential jurors to
fill out questionnaires regarding their qualifica-
tions, and included a question about the race of
the applicant. Relying upon a combination of
statistical and factual considerations, the Court
found that defendants had established a prima
facie case of discriminatory jury selection.
Moreover, the Court held that the process re-
sulted in the systematic exclusion of eligible
black jurors in violation of the sixth
amendment.'9 2
Following the Alexander formula, the first
step in the defendant's case necessitates con-
vincing the court of the existence of eighteen
to twenty-one year olds as an identifiable seg-
ment of the community. While an examination
of objective factors implicitly demonstrates this
fact, a standard by which courts may directly
determine the identity of that or other seg-
ments of the community remains a mystery. As
100 Id. at 889-90 (Brennan, 3., dissenting).
101405 U.S. 625 (1972).
102 Id. at 630.
[Vol. 66
EXCLUSION OF YOUNG ADULTS FROM JURIES
the discussion earlier suggested, the courts' re-
luctance thus far to recognize young adults as
a part of the cross-section stems from a strin-
gent definition of group status. In light of two
current trends, however, a change to a more
flexible approach in defining the cross-section
appears likely.
First, the increase in responsibility extended
to eighteen to twenty-one year olds during the
past decade suggests a general movement to-
ward acceptance of eighteen as the age of po-
litical and social maturity. As society has
adopted that viewpoint, the state and federal
governments have slowly begun to regard
eighteen to tventy-one year olds as part of the
cross-section for matters such as jury service.
Public pressure will presumably compel those
jurisdictions which still exclude young adults
to follow the pattern.
The second trend indicative of future flexibil-
ity in defining the cross-section lies in the Su-
preme Court decisions concerning that cross-
section. In Handing v. United States, for
example, the Court declared unconstitutional a
special statutory exemption from jury service
for women. It thus resolved a struggle which
began when society treated women as an amor-
phous part of the community, much as the
courts now regard eighteen to twenty-one year
olds. Together these two factors lead to the
conclusion that the present unresponsiveness of
the courts to the role of young adults in the
community will change with respect to jury
service.
Under the second element of Alexander, the
defendant must demonstrate the lack of current
justification for the form of exclusion operat-
ing against young adults in the jury process.
Where such exclusion arises from statutory
minimum age provisions, the defendant may
base his argument on Carter v. Jury Commis-
sioners. Although the Court held in that case
that the states possess an undeniable right to
prescribe certain qualifications for their
jurors, 0 3 the states do not have unlimited
powers of discretion. More specifically, the
states do not have
the power to legislate that different treatment
be accorded to persons placed by a statute into
1-' Carter v. jury Commissioners, 396 U.S. 320,
332 (1970).
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly
unrelated to the objective of the statute. 0 4
In establishing jury qualifications, the states'
only legitimate objective is to obtain a panel of
jurors competent to determine the criminal de-
fendant's guilt or innocence. 10 5 In light of the
fact that society deems eighteen to twenty-one
year olds competent to accept most other re-
sponsibilities, the continuation of a statute
which excludes them from jury service bears
no rational relationship to the states' objec-
tives. Furthermore, as the Court stated in
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.:
[J]ury competence is an individual rather
than a group or class matter. That fact lies at
the very heart of the jury system. To disre-
gard it is to open the door to class distinc-
tions and discriminations which are abhorrent
to the democratic ideals of trial by jury.106
Jury selection should not exclude eighteen to
twenty-one year olds on the basis of the hard-
ship which jury duty causes for a few within
that group, since the state and federal jury
statutes make special provision for exemptions
in the case of undue hardship or extreme in-
convenience resulting from jury service. Fi-
nally, the process of voir dire enables the par-
ties to eliminate any jurors, whether eighteen
or fifty, whom they deem incompetent. Thus a
statute which excludes young adults has no
reasonable connection with the objective of se-
1 04 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). The
Court in this case considered the application of the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause to
state legislation which differentiated between the
sexes in probate administration.
205 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). The
Court here recognized:
'The purpose of the jury trial . . . is to pre-
vent oppression by the Government. Providing
the accused with the right to be tried by a
jury of his peers gave him an inestimable
safeguard .... ' Duncam, mtpra, at 156. Given
this purpose, the essential feature of a jury
obviously lies in the inter-position between the
accused and the accuser of the commonsense
judgment of a group of laymen, and in the
community participation and shared responsi-
bility that results from that group's determina-
tion of guilt or innocence.
Id. at 100 (emphasis added).




lecting competent jurors and therefore pre-
vents selection of an impartial jury by unrea-
sonably excluding a part of the cross-section.
Exclusion during the implementation of jury
selection laws allows the defendant to dispense
with argument about the competency of young
adults, since a statute already recognizes that
fact. Instead, the defendant must demonstrate
by factual and statistical analyses that the jury
panel improperly omits representation of young
adults as a segment of the community. Where
the defendant establishes a blatant under-repre-
sentation of young adults on the panel, the
possibility of discrimination in the process then
arises.
If the court accepted such analyses, the bur-
den of proof would shift to the government to
rebut the presumption of improper jury
selection. 10 7 The problems which would con-
front the government would arise not only
from the fundamental nature of the right to an
impartial jury, but also from the subtlety of
the influence on a jury determination which
any segment of the community may have. Fur-
thermore, the government's rebuttal would re-
quire proof that the selection process did not
jeopardize any of the rights and interests
which jury impartiality protects. These rights
and interests include the defendant's right to
an impartial jury, the interests of those per-
sons excluded under an outmoded jury selec-
tion provision or implementation of a reformed
process, and the national or state interest in
preserving a basic tenet of representative gov-
107 Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630
(1972).
ernment-the cross-section standard for jury
panels. 08
CONCLUSION
Under-representation or total exclusion of
young adults constitutes a potential threat to
the sixth amendment guarantee of jury impar-
tiality. The fact that a young defendant may
find himself confronted by a panel of jurors
whose values, attitudes, experiences, and ages
differ greatly from his poses a serious problem.
To alleviate the possibility of bias against
young defendants, jury selection processes
should include in the panel persons of ages
closer to those of young defendants.
An additional threat engendered by the ex-
clusion of young adults from jury panels stems
from the ambiguous matter in which the legal
system and society treat young adults. This
group bears more responsibility for the society
in which it lives than any previous generation
of young adults in this country; yet, its rights
to participate in the functions of the govern-
ment which controls its actions remain as
limited as those of earlier generations. Such
ambiguities only bely the tenets upon which
this representative government operates. Thus
inclusion of eighteen -to twenty-one year olds
would not only increase the probability of a
truly impartial jury system, but would also
encourage a deeper respect for the concepts
of criminal justice.
108 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530
(1975) ; Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 498 (1972).
See also Comment, Jury Discrimination in the
South-a Remedy?, 8 CoLut. J.L. & Soc. PROB.
589, 594-96 (1972).
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